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ABSTRACT 
 
 
IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT ON ECONOMIC 
 AND SOCIAL COHESION  
Yelkenbiçer, Emel Ahu 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
 
Track: European Union and Global Political Economy 
 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. A. Gülgün Tuna 
 
September 2007 
 
 
           The aim of this thesis is to analyze the impact of each phase of enlargement on 
the regional policy of the EU. It mainly focuses on the socio-economic indices like the 
economic potential, GDP growth, inflation, euro trends, unemployment, labor market 
participation and its industrial distribution, education, social protection, technological 
performance by considering research and development expenditures, infrastructure 
and patents application. This research shows the general situation in various countries 
through special data and makes a comparison between the new and previous members. 
The overall assessment is that the enlargement strategy of the EU makes the regional 
policy ineffective. In other words, it becomes difficult to overcome regional 
imbalances with the admission of the new comers. In this context, enlargement is the 
major cause of the rise of socio-economic disparities. 
 
Keywords: The European Union, economic and social cohesion, enlargement.  
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ÖZET 
 
 AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ GENİŞLEMESİNİN EKONOMİK VE SOSYAL UYUMA 
ETKİLERİ 
Yelkenbiçer, Emel Ahu 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Bölüm: Avrupa Birliği ve Global Ekonomi Politikası 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. A. Gülgün Tuna 
 
Eylül 2007 
 
 
Bu tezin amacı genişlemenin her sahasının Avrupa Birliği bölgesel politikasındaki 
etkisini analiz etmektir. Tez genellikle ekonomik potensiyel, Gayrisafi Yurtiçi Hasıla 
büyümesi, enflasyon, euro ile ilgili veriler, işsizlik, işgücü piyasasına katılım ve bunun 
sektörel dağılımı, eğitim, sosyal koruma, araştırma ve geliştirme harcamaları, altyapı 
ve patent başvurusu gibi teknolojik performansları da göz önünde bulundurarak üye 
ülkelerdeki sosyo-ekonomik endekslere odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışma özel veriler 
yoluyla farklı ülkelerdeki genel durumu göstermekte ve yeni ve eski üyeler arasında 
kıyaslama yapmaktadır. Genel değerlendirme olarak Avrupa Birliği genişleme 
politikası bölgesel politikayı etkisiz hale getirmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, yeni 
üyelerin AB ye girmesiyle birlikte bölgesel dengesizliklerin üstesinden gelmek zor 
hale gelmektedir. Bu noktada, genişleme politikası sosyo-ekonomik farklılıkların ana 
nedenidir. 
 
 Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, ekonomik ve sosyal uyum, genişleme. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
            The enlargement policy of the European Union is widely accepted as the 
most strategic and necessary formula for closer integration, macroeconomic 
management, welfare, peace, security, prosperity and regional stability. Nowadays, it 
is claimed that to be an active player in the world and the most competitive economy 
are the major reasons of the EU in expanding its borders. As there are new 
developments in the 21st century resulting from globalization of financial markets 
and technological achievements, the extension of the EU will be helpful in realizing 
its new goals. When the initial attempt started during the 1950s with six founding 
members who tried to establish a Community, this integrated zone grew in size and 
population. In each phase, the entry of the new members into the EU structure brings 
both pros and cons for its future.  
            Some argue that when the number of countries is multiplied, the EU succeeds 
to benefit from an economic success, thanks to the strong trade and investment ties 
between the member states, an increase in the competitiveness, dynamism in the 
financial sector and a rise in the foreign direct investment. However, the majority of 
the EU members have continuing handicaps. In other words, increased socio-
economic disparities in terms of economic growth, inflation, unemployment, social 
exclusion, poverty, R&D, patents application and infrastructure emerge as major 
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challenges. Hence, regional policy of the European Union is on the agenda which 
aims to reduce the gap between different countries through structural and cohesion 
funds. So, increasing regional competitiveness, job creation and harmonius 
development are the necessities of the regional policy. But, the effectiveness of the 
regional arrangements remains unclear with 27 countries. As this field of study 
becomes a topical subject by creating contrasting perspectives between many 
politicians, academicians as well as EU members, it becomes very important to focus 
more on the enlargement. The entry of the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) is the main cause of these disagreements because they are relatively poor 
compared to the other members of the EU, historically different and this is the 
biggest integration in terms of population and the number of states. Therefore, this 
thesis is helpful in answering some questions concerning the widening debate. 
             In this regard, this thesis purports to analyze the impact of the EU 
enlargement on the regional policy. In order to calculate the real costs and benefits, it 
tries to make a comparison between different countries and to shed light on the basic 
socio-economic statistics. It argues that it becomes difficult to promote economic and 
social cohesion and enlargement causes a threat to the functioning of the regional 
development activities. That’s why the creation of employment opportunities, GDP 
growth and technological improvements do not seem to be realistic enough when the 
number of countries grows rapidly. In that point, it is not suitable to determine that 
there is real convergence in the EU because the regional policy is not successful 
enough to solve the problems that member states face. In sum, the costs outweigh the 
benefits, especially with the admission of the Central and Eastern European countries 
because the marginalized parts of the EU increase, there aren’t any effective 
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technology-oriented businesses in most parts of the EU, economic and social indices 
prove that the fulfillment of the Lisbon target becomes difficult. 
            In order to achieve the purpose, various research methods have been used 
such as the examination of the secondary data from the major publications in the 
field like the official documents of the European Commission, research on the 
internet data, academic journals acquired from the Bilkent University Library Center 
of EU Studies and other related types of articles which are based on enlargement and 
the regional policy. Many statistics are used to show the socio-economic evolution of 
the EU from the first to last enlargement. 
           The thesis contains four chapters. As a first step, it begins with an overview of 
the key dates of enlargement and then focuses on the membership criteria. As the 
historical process of enlargement is the main analysis of this chapter, member states 
from the first to sixth enlargement while taking into consideration the problems that 
occurred during the negotiations, candidates’ economic background and their 
expectations from the EU are explained deeply. 
           After presenting the meaning of economic and social cohesion, the second 
chapter includes an overview of the regional policy. It later gives information about 
the reasons behind the establishment of the European regional policy. It also focuses 
on the objectives for the period 2000-2006 such as improving regional 
competitiveness by allocating financial resources to the problematic regions, 
increasing employment level via education and training activities and ameliorating 
the conditions in rural parts. In addition to these priorities other crucial objectives 
like the Lisbon strategy of growth and employment and other strategies that cover the 
period 2007-2013 are described. The chapter then continues with five different 
principles of the EU funds, namely co-ordination, concentration, programming, 
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additionality and partnership. The task and target of structural funds, the cohesion 
fund, the community initiatives and the pre-accession funds that are the key 
mechanisms responsible with budget distribution to the less favored parts are 
observed. In the final episode, new regulations are emphasized. 
           The third chapter relies on important socio-economic data in order to prove 
that there is a noticeable recession in the members due to the enlargement burden, 
and the EU is far from the Lisbon objective of employment, innovative actions and 
economic growth. The chapter begins with the partial analysis of the Cohesion 
Reports that are published by the European Commission. They are really important 
as the regional facts from 1996 to 2006 are outlined. Especially the Second Report on 
Economic and Social Cohesion indicates the challenges of the EU-27 such as income 
handicaps, ineffective labor market participation in the workforce, an increase in the 
peripheral areas and agricultural disarrays. The second part contains a deeper outlook 
under various headings to show the influence of the each phase of enlargement. 
Firstly, the economic potential of the EU-27 is given and the emphasis is on the 
foreign direct investment, economic growth, GDP per capita in PPP, inflation level 
and euro zone requirements. Later on, it moves to the social indicators of 
unemployment of both female and older workers, education, social protection and 
poverty in the EU as a whole. Finally, technological achievements are analyzed by 
looking at the past and recent trends in research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, the orientation towards high-tech industries, patents application and 
infrastructural investments. The chapter ends with an overall assessment. 
           The fourth chapter concentrates on the threats and gains of the EU 
enlargement and points out that the accession of the Central and Eastern European 
countries are the major reason of the socio-economic downturn. The chapter studies 
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the CEECs as a case by providing different views before their entry and the facts. It 
also describes the budgetary, agricultural and employment-related risks by 
comparing the figures of the EU-15 and EU-10 which is really helpful to understand 
the real gap between the newcomers and the previous members. The second part of 
the fourth chapter examines some of the selected countries’ indicators to specify that 
the EU has to be attentive to the countries real needs. These country-specific 
experiences draw attention to the continuing regional imbalances in Poland and 
Slovakia. It also shows that even one of the biggest economies of the EU, namely 
Germany, faces budgetary disorder. Moreover, there is a possibility that one of the 
marginalized countries like Ireland has a chance to reverse its negative socio-
economic situation and becomes a net contributor to the EU budget. 
           After providing a brief summary of four chapters, the conclusion part covers 
the main findings of the study and then gives some recommendations. It also outlines 
some future predictions about the impact of the enlargement on regional policy. 
           In sum, I hope to make a contribution to the EU studies on the issues of 
enlargement and the regional policy. The basic indices can be helpful in comparing 
the socio-economic situation and technological achievements of the newcomers and 
the previous members and for those who are concerned with the capacity of the EU 
to absorb new countries.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
HISTORICAL PROCESS OF EU ENLARGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
2.1 A Chronological Review  
 
           The idea of European integration was first put into practice on 9 May 1950 
with the placement of coal and steel resources of France and Germany under a High 
Authority thanks to the French foreign affairs minister Robert Schuman and Jean 
Monnet.1 Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer as well as Alcide de 
Gasperi knew that in order to overcome the devastating consequences of the Second 
World War, they had to consider rebuilding Europe. The promotion of peace and 
security were their main expectations. It was this idea that led to the establishment of 
the European Coal and Steel Community. Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands created an integrated zone in Europe.2 The 
Community grew with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 which was efficient in creating a 
common market between the member states. The Treaty also created European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community 
(EEC) which was later known as the European Community (EC).  The main 
objective of the EC was to realize the free movement of goods, services, people and 
capital through customs union between member states. 
                                               
1
 Emmanuel Apel, European Monetary Integration, 1958-2002 ( London: Routledge, 1998), 4. 
2
 “History of the European Union”, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_EU.) 
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           The next step was the decision to create a common market by the end of 1992 
after the removal of non-tariff barriers with the White Paper’s 300 measures.3 As a 
result, Single European Act came into the force on 1 July 1987. Its basic aim was the 
completion of the single market and closer cooperation on the environment, research 
and technology.  
           Although the Single European Act was a key in promoting economic 
integration within the European Community, there was not any political integration. 
So, the decision to create a political union was emphasized by French President 
François Mitterand at the Fontainebleau European Council in 1984.4 Following the 
intergovernmental conference in 1985, the Treaty on European Union which was 
known as Maastricht Treaty was signed in February 1992. This agreement was very 
important in the sense that it ensured the creation of the European Union, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. It also set the 
timetable for Economic and Monetary Union. 
           The Treaty of Amsterdam which was signed in 1997 came into force in 1999. 
It gave more power to the European Parliament and made some changes in the 
Maastricht Treaty such as strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and reforming the major institutions of the European Union.5 
           After the introduction of the Euro as an official currency on 1 January 1999, 
12 member states, namely Belgium, Germany, Greece (joined on 1 January 2001), 
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and 
                                               
3
 Apel, op.cit., 7-8. 
4
 John McCormick, Understanding The European Union, A Concise Introduction ( New York: 
Palgrave, 1999), 78-79. 
5
 Ibid. 
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Finland accepted to use the common currency.6 Finally, on 1 January 2002 the Euro 
entered into circulation. 
           After drawing a general framework of the enlargement, it is suitable to give 
some dates of the major enlargements of the Union which will be described in 
greater detail in this chapter. The first enlargement took place in 1973 with the 
accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland to the European Union.7 The 
second enlargement which was in 1981 brought Greece into the Union and it was 
followed by the third enlargement in 1986 with Spain and Portugal. The fourth one 
was in 1995 in which Austria, Sweden and Finland became members. Subsequently, 
the fifth integration took place in 2004 with the accession of Central and Eastern 
European and Mediterranean countries namely Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. On 1 January 
2007, the European Union welcomed the membership of Romania and Bulgaria.   
           In particular, each phase of enlargement contributed positively to the 
development of different kind of reforms. To give an example, with the first 
enlargement the Union adopted a regional and common fisheries policy and with the 
second as well as with the third one single market and a stronger social policy were 
accepted.8 Moreover, these enlargements gave more power to the European 
Parliament. The passage into an Economic and Monetary Union and new policy 
areas including foreign policy and justice and home affairs were ensured by the 
fourth enlargement. 
 
 
                                               
6
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_EU. 
7
 “Past Enlargements”, Europa, 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/index_en.htm.) 
8
 Fraser Cameron, The Future of Europe, Integration and Enlargement ( London: Routledge, 2004) , 
1. 
 9 
2.2 Membership Criteria 
           Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome implies that “Any European state may 
apply to become a member of the Community.”9 Article 49 of the Treaty on 
European Union underlines that “any European state which respects the principles set 
out in Article 6 (1) may apply to become a member of the Union.”10 These principles 
are democracy, liberty, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  
           There are evidently other kinds of criteria that countries should fulfill in order 
to become a member state of the European Union. On 22 June 1993, the Copenhagen 
European Council put three criteria known as the Copenhagen Criteria.11 Politically 
speaking, the country must have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. In economic terms, 
candidate countries must have a functioning market economy and they must handle 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union. The third 
criterion is based on the adoption of the acquis communautaire which is the body of 
the European law. The European Union’s absorption capacity can be marked as a 
fourth condition although it was not implicated in the Copenhagen criteria. There are 
no limits to countries for their membership after adopting the acquis communautaire 
which refers to all regulations, directives and rules of the European Union. 
           In 1995, during the Madrid European Council it was announced that 
candidates should revise their administrative and judicial structures in line with the 
                                               
9
 Karen E. Smith, “Enlargement and European Order” in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, 
International Relations and the European Union ( Oxford University Press, 2005), 276. 
10
 John K. Glenn, “EU Enlargement” in Michelle Cini, European Union Politics ( Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 214. 
11
 Smith, op. cit., 276. 
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European Union legislation.12 Moreover, the Helsinki European Council in 1999 
adds another criterion for candidate countries to apply the objectives of the European 
Union which are determined in the treaties. The Treaty of Nice in 2000 accords the 
final point by underlining the importance of completing the necessary reforms for 
candidate countries. 
           The formal procedure for candidate countries especially begins after the 
delivery of a formal application to the European Council.13 Then, the Council 
requests the European Commission to declare a positive or negative opinion for the 
membership. An Accession Conference is held if there are not any problems for the 
membership of the applicant country. In a situation in which a country can not fulfill 
these obligations, transitional periods can be given in order to complete the criteria of 
membership. Following this procedural calendar, negotiations are initiated and at the 
end the European Parliament must approve the membership. Eventually, the 
ratification process starts in all members of the European Union as well as in 
candidate countries through referendum or through parliamentary ratification.  
 
2.3 The First Enlargement 
 
           The original six founders of the European Union had grown in size and 
reached nine by the first enlargement with the United Kingdom, Denmark and 
Ireland in January 1973. The first enlargement can also be called Northern 
enlargement or the first European Free Trade Association (EFTA) integration in the 
history of the European Union because all of the candidates except Ireland are 
members of the EFTA. 
 
                                               
12
 European Commission, The European Union: Still Enlarging ( Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2001) , 8. 
13
 Glenn,op. cit., 215. 
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           2.3.1 The United Kingdom 
 
           The United Kingdom’s position was very noticeable in the establishment of 
the European Free Trade Association which was signed in 1960 with the 
participation of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.14 
Although its objective was to provide free trade between its members, it could not 
make a big success because participants traded more with the European Community 
members rather than its own founders. That’s why the United Kingdom realized that 
the membership of the European Community was more beneficial. As a result, the 
country applied the EC for membership on August 1961 and negotiations started in 
1962. Unfortunately, the French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the British 
application twice both in 1963 and then in 1967 due to several reasons.15 For 
example, de Gaulle believed that the United Kingdom would slowdown the entire 
integration process because the country had a special relationship with the United 
States. That’s why the British membership meant greater US influence in the 
European Union policies. In addition, the United Kingdom could cause a challenge 
for France in the leadership issue. It is evident that the country participated in the 
accession negotiations after de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969.  
           The European Community membership was an opportunity for the country 
because its position as a world superpower was no longer attainable.16 To continue 
its reputation in the world, the membership was important in the sense that the EC 
was the major regional bloc. Finally, in 1973 UK was recognized as a member but its 
membership represented a problem in the structure of the EC because in 1974 the 
country desired to renegotiate the treaty of Accession. Afterwards, its awkward 
                                               
14
 McCormick, op. cit., 71. 
15
 Glenn, op. cit., 212. 
16
 Alasdair Blair, The European Union Since 1945 ( London: Longman, 1999), 186. 
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position towards greater integration especially in the monetary and social issues 
continued during the 1980s. 
 
2.3.2 Denmark 
           As Denmark was an agricultural country, its concern in the application was 
based on gaining more export markets in Europe and improving its industrial 
development as it experienced economic problems during the 1950s.17 When the 
United Kingdom applied for membership in 1961, as an EFTA member, Denmark’s 
decision was also positive in order to secure its export markets in Europe. Since its 
application was linked with that of Ireland and Britain, the country was vetoed as 
well.  
          The picture in Denmark was very complicated due to some disagreements 
between different political parties. To give an example, while the agrarians and the 
majority of the Conservatives supported the membership of the EC, the Social 
Liberals favored the establishment of the Nordic Economic Union (NORDEK) 
instead.18 The Hague Summit in 1969 made the situation better and the door opened 
for Denmark’s membership. 
          During the negotiations it seems clear that the country did not cause any 
disturbances in the EC. The membership of Denmark into the European Union took 
place in January 1973 with a 63 % yes vote in the referendum.19 The main reason 
behind this majority vote was agricultural including obtaining a satisfying gain from 
the Common Agricultural Policy. However, negative votes were related with the 
expected decline in the national sovereignty. 
                                               
17
 Johnny Laursen, “A Kingdom Divided:Denmark” in Wolfram Kaiser, Jürgen Elvert, European 
Union Enlargement, A comparative History ( London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 35. 
18
 Ibid, 39. 
19
 Nikolaj Petersen, “In the Strategic Triangle” in Robert Bideleux, Richard Taylor, European 
Integration and Disintegration ( London: Routledge, 1996), 94-95. 
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2.3.3 Ireland 
           Ireland’s decision to join the EC was also based on economic benefits mainly 
agricultural ones because there was a huge amount of farming population in the 
country; so Ireland had great expectations from agricultural exports as its economic 
situation during the 1950’s was far from being competitive.20 The other reason was 
that the country was heavily dependent on the United Kingdom in economic terms. 
Although its application was also vetoed twice similarly with the United Kingdom 
and Denmark, it attempted to improve its competitive position in the world by 
undertaking serious reforms. Following de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969, Ireland 
finally entered the EC in January 1973 by an 83 % majority vote in the referendum. 
           The membership was beneficial for the country during the 1980s and 1990s 
because it experienced an effective growth in its agricultural sector and also managed 
to stand alone without being dependent on the United Kingdom anymore.21 
           Due to its position of neutrality that created a challenge in the construction of 
a common defense policy, the Irish case was unique and interesting.22 Another 
explanation behind this was its success in following independent policies and 
economic growth although the United Kingdom had an important place in its 
decision making structure in the past. So, this shows that even a small country had an 
opportunity to reverse its isolation through membership in the EC. 
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           2.4 The Second Enlargement 
           In this section, I will examine only Greece but in many cases, Spain and 
Portugal are also evaluated together under the second enlargement because these 
three countries have similar economic and political backgrounds. But, Spain and 
Portugal will be described under the third enlargement as their accession into the EC 
was in 1986 rather than in 1981 like Greece. 
          The accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland into the EC led to 
the beginning of the second enlargement when the negotiations were opened in 1976 
with Greece. The country became a full member in 1981. 
           The candidacy of Greece caused some problems within the Community 
institutions because the European Commission was not sure whether it was ready or 
not. That’s why before the accession, the Commission proposed a period of 
preparation for the country which was rejected later by the European Council’s 
president Giscard d’Estaing.23 In reality, Greece was poorer than current members, 
an agriculturally dependent country which was under the rule of a dictatorship for 
many years like Spain and Portugal. Therefore, it was not surprising that existing 
member states had some doubts whether Greece could fulfill the obligations of the 
Community membership. 
           An analysis of Greek objectives denotes that the country’s main consideration 
relating to the membership concern was security. It faced external threats and the 
membership was a chance to be safe.24 In addition, raising the living standards of its 
citizens, making reforms with respect to the modernization process of the country 
were other reasons. As Greece was an underdeveloped, poor, trade-dependent 
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country which experienced foreign interferences by Great Powers in the world, the 
European Community was a favorable option for the country in order to reverse its 
weak status. Furthermore, its problems with North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the US on the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus affected the 
country’s reputation in the world.25 Gaining the full support of the EC against Turkey 
was another important motivation of the Greeks in the gateway to the EC. 
           The first application of the country for associate membership was in June 
1959. The Treaty of Association in 1962 which was frozen later during the Greek 
military regime ensured an equal commitment to Greek products in the EC market.26 
When the military rule was over, the country applied for full membership in 1975 in 
order to restore its democracy and to win political support from the Community. 
Later, in May 1979 a Treaty of Accession was signed and the country obtained full 
member status in January 1981. 
           During the 1980s another question was raised after the electoral victory of 
Andreas Papandreou’s Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK).27 Papandreou 
campaigned against the Community membership by offering a renegotiation and 
many concessions. It is a fact that the Greeks posed serious problems after their entry 
rather than during the negotiations.  In 1982, Greece prepared a memorandum and 
desired to obtain more funds from the EC in order to improve its poor infrastructure 
and weak industries. As a response the Community offered some Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes with the aim of providing regional development.  
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           The success of Papandreou continued at the end of the 1980s in influencing 
the EC to support the poorest regions and raise its expenditures on regional as well as 
social projects. 
 
          2.5 The Third Enlargement 
           Spain and Portugal were in fact poorer than the current members of the EC 
like Greece and there were some worries related to the fishery sector and 
immigration issue in both countries. Despite these anxieties, the Community saw 
their memberships in a positive sense to diffuse democracy into these continents and 
to promote effective relationship of these countries with NATO as well as with the 
Western Europe.28 After the opening of negotiations in 1978-79, Spain and Portugal 
entered the EC in 1986. 
           The significance of this enlargement could be specified with the incorporation 
of new treaties into the EC namely the Single European Act in 1986 which was 
followed by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The SEA was worthy because it 
enhanced a basis for the single market and European Political Cooperation (EPC). 
New policy areas on the economic-social cohesion, environment, research and 
technology were also accepted. The Maastricht Treaty gave a timetable for the 
acceptance of the single currency, established the second pillar of the EC which was 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and provided closer cooperation on 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).29 But the most effective event was the decision to 
replace the name of the European Community with the European Union. 
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2.5.1 Spain 
           Spain was controlled by authoritarian rule for many years and it established 
close links with the EC only after the death of Francisco Franco in 1975.30  
           There were some problems like fisheries and agriculture that it had to confront 
before being a member because the EC feared its agriculturally oriented position. 
The country’s enormous fishing fleet posed a challenge for the Community and as an 
agricultural country, its situation was considered dangerous in Italy and France.31 
Despite this reluctance, Spain applied for membership in 1962 which was turned 
later to a preferential trade agreement in 1970. The death of Francisco Franco 
enabled Adolfo Suarez to be a prime minister in 1977. When the country submitted 
its application for full membership, Italy and France opposed it due to agricultural 
concerns; so formal negotiations did not begin until 1979. 
           The Community undoubtedly had its own problems including budgetary 
provisions that led to continuing disagreements over the membership of Spain during 
this time period. Also, turbulences continued on the issues of agriculture, fisheries 
and on the reduction of trade barriers for Spain’s industrial products.32 Consequently, 
the membership of the country had to wait until the resolution of the Community’s 
internal problems.  
           Spain’s membership meant an increase in the Community’s territory by one 
third, cultivated land by 30 %, agricultural population by 25 % and fishing fleet by 
70 %.33 As the country’s olive oil production, citrus-fruit export and vineyards 
captured a big pie in the European market, it was not surprising that the current 
members defined its accession as a potential hazard to the future of their industries. 
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Due to these disturbances, the EC made a decision to employ a transitional period for 
Spain. “At the beginning of 1985, a transitional period of seven years was established 
for the integration of Spanish agriculture in the CAP, along with an additional 
extension between four and seven years for the more competitive fruit and olive oil, 
among other produce.”34 Ultimately, the country was able to be a member in January 
1986. 
 
2.5.2 Portugal 
           Like Spain, Portugal was under the influence of an authoritarian rule for many 
years trying to return to democracy. The collapse of this regime in 1974 provided an 
important step for the country in order to be closer with the EC; so it submitted its 
application for full membership in 1977.35 
           Although Portugal wanted to become a member in the 1960s when the United 
Kingdom made its first application to the EC, there were numerous factors which 
prevented the country from submitting its membership application like the negative 
economic conditions, the colonial problem and its authoritarian regime.36 De 
Gaulle’s veto also negatively affected Portugal and it was not until the 1969 Hague 
Summit that the EC decided to talk with the non-applicant EFTA states in which 
Portugal was included. It concluded a trade agreement with the EC in 1972. The 
overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 designated the movement into the 
democracy that made the overall thinking towards membership positive in the EC.  
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           After its formal application for full membership in 1977, the negotiations 
lasted until 1985. While Portugal was relatively small in size, far from causing any 
threat for the current member’s industries and production, the long story for the 
accession was based on the remaining difficulties of the EC in the case of Spain for a 
long time.37  
           The EC was finally satisfied after necessary adjustments in the new 
Portuguese Constitution and stated that the democratization process was now 
completed in the country. The Treaty of Accession was signed in 1985 and 
Portugal’s accession was completed on 1 January 1986.38 
 
            2.6 The Fourth Enlargement  
           The end of the Cold War was proof for many European countries that being a 
member of the EC was necessary not only in terms of economic benefits like being a 
part of the free trade agreement between members but also in terms of obtaining a 
voice in European policy formulation.39 With these considerations in mind, Austria, 
Sweden and Denmark submitted their membership.  
          During the negotiations, these countries did not pose any significant challenge 
but in terms of the CFSP which was accepted in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, some 
disagreements occurred. To take an example, Austria was afraid of opening its 
borders because it was not satisfied with the transit issue.40 Sweden and Finland did 
not want to lower their environmental standards into the EU level. These problems 
were resolved and they became members in 1995; so the EU now had 15 countries 
within its framework. 
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           The importance of this fourth enlargement could be described as follows: It 
was the last enlargement in which all of the members were attached to the existing 
European policies and institutions.41 Additionally, Maastricht Treaty which was an 
efficient turning point in the EU’s history was concluded during this enlargement. It 
was evident that the relationship between the EU and EFTA became much closer 
with the accession of three more members of EFTA into the EU. By 1995 all 
members of the EFTA except Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein were 
under the label of the EU. 
  
2.6.1 Austria 
           Historically speaking, Austria’s policy was always based on creating strong 
ties with the EU. With this consideration in mind, it tried to be a member of the EU 
during the 1960s along with its hope to participate in the free trade agreement in the 
1970s.42 Its position was especially important because the country committed itself to 
improve the EFTA relations with the EU during the 1970s and 1980s. 
           On 17 July 1989, Austria applied for membership but it declared that the 
country tried to protect its neutrality position by the words: “internationally 
recognized status as a neutral country.”43 There were many factors behind its 
application such as the possible loss by being excluded from the internal market due 
to its trade dependence on the EU, the necessity of economic reforms within the 
country and raising good relations with Eastern European countries. 
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           In 1991, the Commission declared that the country was eligible for 
membership in economic terms. However negotiations were not totally problematic. 
The entry of Austria posed serious problems within the EU in terms of transport and 
the environment. As Austria was one of the environmentally sensitive countries, the 
EU must increase its environmental standards and was obliged to follow more 
environment friendly policies.44 Actually, Alpine transit also posed some 
disturbances. In relation, the country did not want to change its law which restricts 
foreign ownership of property.45 There were also other concerns in terms of 
agriculture. 
           Despite these problems, Austria held a referendum and its accession was 
accepted by almost 67 % which brought the country into the membership on 1 
January 1995 together with Finland and Sweden.  
 
2.6.2 Sweden 
           Sweden was also a neutral country that feared from international changes after 
the Cold War such as contestations between many countries as well as the bipolar 
climate of the world. There was an ambiguous picture in the entire world. That’s why 
security thought was the main item on the road towards membership. 
           In fact, the Swedish case was similar to that of Austria during the 1960s. Its 
application was also vetoed during that time period but in 1970 it managed to open 
the negotiations with the EU and signed a free trade agreement in 1972.46 Although 
there were some improvements in their relationship, during the 1970s and early 80s, 
Sweden realized that the membership was not an intelligent option by stating that the 
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common foreign policy formulation of the EU was not very active in protecting its 
members and the establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union would hurt the 
neutrality situation of the country.47 Hence, it was not until the end of the Cold War 
that rapprochement towards the accession occurred. 
           The Swedish government submitted its application on 1 July 1991 but there 
were still some problems such as harmonization of the agricultural sector in line with 
the EU, regional as well as neutrality policy of the country and finally CFSP.48 
Sweden replied that it would contribute positively to the CFSP. As a result, 
negotiations started in 1993 and it was followed by the referendum that gave 52.3 % 
yes vote. At the end, Sweden joined the EU on 1 January 1995. 
 
2.6.3 Finland 
           European integration was never considered as vital issue for Finland during 
the 1950s and 1960s as it tried to be closer with the Soviet Union instead of the 
members of the EU. It participated in the formation of Nordic economic cooperation 
for political reasons. Its foreign policy welcomed new changes in the 1980s because 
Finland’s trade relations with the Soviet Union declined. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union also constituted an important step which made the country more dependent on 
the EU in terms of trade. Its export and import volume declined sharply, 
unemployment level rose; so the country was faced with a deep economic recession. 
           In 1992, the Finnish government submitted a report to the Parliament 
specifying that the accession would create new jobs, would stabilize interest rates 
and the country would gain an opportunity to attract more investors.49 Furthermore, 
this would give a chance for Finland to obtain a voice in the European policies 
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concerning environmental reforms and the forest industry. However, the country was 
aware of the negative consequences of membership in the agricultural area.  
           After its application for membership on 18 March 1992, Finland’s 
membership was accepted by a 57 % vote in 1994. It managed to be a member of the 
EU on 1 January 1995. 
 
           2.7  The Fifth Enlargement in General 
           Historically speaking, the collapse of communism along with the dissolution 
of Soviet Union were turning points that forced the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC) to join the EU under the label of “return to Europe”.50 These 
countries were under Soviet influence for a long time and they were separated from 
Europe; so the post-communist countries tried to transform their economies. 
However, there were many resisters who refused to accept their membership because 
they were militarily unstable, economically poor compared to existing members of 
the EU and agriculturally dependent states. This showed that they would create some 
disturbances in the budgetary issues. In contrast, there were others who welcomed 
their candidacy by stating that it would enhance peace, democracy, prosperity and 
would contribute positively to security. 
           To this end, the fifth enlargement was surely the most challenging and 
geographically largest integration within the EU. That’s why it is crucial to follow a 
step by step approach in order to understand the relationship between the CEECs and 
the EU much more clearly. 
           “In June 1988, the Community and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), the organization for economic cooperation among communist 
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countries, established official relations.”51 Then these relations were extended 
through the PHARE program, Europe Agreements and TACIS during the 1989 and 
early 1990’s. Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Economic Reconstruction 
(PHARE) which was designed to give financial support to Poland as well as Hungary 
was extended to other Central and Eastern European countries later. Technical 
Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) also provided 
assistance to these countries. By looking at the Europe Agreements, it was seen that 
it enhanced association agreements between the CEECs and the EU. 
           In 1993 the decision of the Copenhagen European Council was important 
because it made clear that “the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
that so desire shall become members of the European Union.”52 Accession would 
take place if the candidates could ensure the obligations of the membership. In 
addition to the three criteria that were described early, the absorption capacity of the 
EU was added as a fourth one. 
           In 1994, a pre-accession strategy was adopted at the Essen European Council 
to prepare the CEECs for membership. This strategy was based on Europe 
Agreements, Accession Partnership and National Programmes for the Adoption of 
the Acquis, opening of European Community programmes and agencies.53 Moreover, 
the EU decided to help these countries under the PHARE programme, with 
environment and transport investment support (ISPA), agricultural and rural 
development support (SAPARD), co-financing with the international financial 
institutions (IFIs). From 1994 to 1996 Central and Eastern European countries 
applied for membership. Consequently, The European Commission published a 
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report in 1997 to evaluate their application which was Agenda 2000.54 In this 
document, it was underlined that candidate countries must accept the Copenhagen 
criteria in order to be eligible.55 Also, it specified the difficulties that the EU faced in 
the Common Agricultural Policy and in the structural funds. Hence, it made some 
budgetary arrangements. 
           At the Luxembourg European Council in 1997, an enhanced pre-accession 
strategy was launched and the Council decided to open the negotiations with six 
CEECs namely Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus. 
These countries were called the Luxembourg Group. In 1999, The European Council 
at Helsinki determined to initiate the negotiations with remaining countries such as 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia. These countries were known as the Helsinki 
Group.56 
           In September 2001, the Commission made it clear that all of the applicant 
countries except Bulgaria and Romania could participate in the next round. 
Eventually, at the Copenhagen European Council in 2002 the Commission 
announced that these ten countries would be able to take on the obligations of 
membership and would become members of the EU on 1 May 2004.57  
           After this historical background, it is useful to explain the negotiation process 
in order to see the strategy of the EU for the CEECs in general. 
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          2.7.1  Negotiations 
           In fact, the EU pursued different principles during the negotiation process. For 
example, while candidate countries must accept and apply the acquis 
communautaire, some transitional periods could be given to some candidates in order 
to catch up and negotiations would be conducted one by one because the EU already 
knew that each country’s situation was not similar.58  
           The accession negotiations began on 31 March 1998 with the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus. The principle of differentiation was 
conducted during the negotiations. This meant that each country would be judged 
according to its own degree of preparation to be a member. Candidate countries 
should fulfill the whole acquis and the EU divided it into 31 chapters.  
           Actually the key features of the negotiations could be analyzed under different 
phases like the screening59 of the acquis in 1998, the opening of easy chapters from 
1998 to 2000, the beginning of negotiations with other countries such as Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia in 2000, the introduction of the roadmap which gave a 
timetable for completing the negotiations in 2001 and finally the discussion of 
budgetary chapters and agreement in 2002.60 
           In December 2002, at the Copenhagen European Council, the accession 
negotiations were finalized with these ten countries and finally Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
became members of the EU on 1 May 2004. 
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2.8 The Last Enlargement in General 
           The last integration strategy of the EU consists of Bulgaria and Romania 
together.  
           Romania has built up strong ties with the EU since the early 1970’s by signing 
special agreements which ensured the country to participate in the Community’s 
Generalised System of Preferences.61 During the 1990s it continued to evolve better 
contact with the EU. This led to the first application of Romania on 22 June 1995. At 
the Helsinki Summit in 1999 the EU decided to open the negotiations and ultimately 
the accession talks formally began in 2000.  
           By turning our attention to Bulgaria, it could be understandable that the real 
connections began during the 1990s because the country signed various kinds of 
trade related agreements in this period.62 The first step towards membership 
commenced in 1995 with its application of the EU membership. Like Romania, 1999 
Helsinki Summit was a fateful step because it ensured the opening of the negotiations 
in 2000. 
           In 2002, the European Council declared that Bulgaria and Romania would 
become members of the EU in 2007.63 Accession negotiations were over in 2004 and 
in 2005 the Accession Treaty was concluded. Then, the European Commission 
launched a report in 2006 to explain that both of the countries made considerable 
improvements and there was not any obstacle for the accession. However, there were 
still some anxieties over the issues of judicial reform and the fight against organized 
crime as well as corruption. By November 2006, the ratification process was 
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completed for Romania and Bulgaria and they became members of the EU on 1 
January 2007. 
           To conclude, it is evident that the EU’s enlargement policy consists of several 
factors. Towards the full economic, political as well as social integration process, a 
united Europe is vitally crucial and that’s why to promote peace, freedom, political 
stability, prosperity, human rights, cultural and ideological diversity, better quality of 
life through its members, democracy and security the  European Union enlarges. 
There are also economic reasons to realize enlargement. In order to improve trade 
and investment flows between its members and in order to be competitive in the 
world after the globalization resulting from being a global player, the number of the 
member states has increased. Hence, enlargement strategy’s main goal is to ensure a 
more integrated Europe and to create an ever closer union.  
           In summary, the original six members like Belgium, West Germany, 
Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands reached nine with the accession of 
the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland in 1973. The second enlargement made 
the EU ten with Greece in 1981. 1986 was also important with the entry of Spain and 
Portugal together. The fourth enlargement was in 1995 which brought Austria, 
Sweden and Finland into the EU. The most challenging and interesting integration 
was surely on 1 May 2004 because ten new countries were able to become members, 
namely Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. The most recent integration was on 1 January 2007 
which made Romania and Bulgaria members of the EU. There are also some 
candidate countries like Croatia, Turkey, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
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Macedonia and some potential candidate states such as Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo.64 
           Although each stage of integration contributed positively to the EU’s reforms, 
institutions and policies, it also causes some negative effects; so the EU tries to cope 
with those disturbances because at the end it wants to promote cohesion. There are 
still many unanswered questions whether it succeeds to solve these turbulences or 
what are the impacts of these enlargements in economic and social terms on its 
members.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
REGIONAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
 
 
 
           3.1 What Is Economic And Social Cohesion? 
 
           “Cohesion” which is an element of the regional policy “refers to a set of 
activities designed to reduce disparities and promote a more even pattern of 
economic development across the EU.”65 Actually, it covers projects including 
assistance to countries which are facing difficulties like low per capita income, high 
level of unemployment, industrial difficulties and social imbalances through 
structural and cohesion funds. This means that the EU tries to provide money to its 
members with weak socio-economic conditions. 
           Economic and social cohesion includes improving the regional 
competitiveness of the countries whose developments are lagging behind, helping the 
modernization process, promoting economic growth as well as social equity. 
           Since the earlier steps of the European Union cohesion was on the agenda. 
The Treaty of Rome pointed out that economic and social cohesion covered 
accommodation of harmonious development, better standards of living, good 
working conditions, solution to worker’s problems in education, employment, 
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discrimination and social security.66 This showed that reducing regional disparities 
was the main focus. As economic integration policies of the EU including the 
competition of the internal market and monetary union became the major reform 
process during the 1970s and 1980s, economic and social cohesion gained much 
more importance due to severe economic problems in the weaker regions. The Single 
European Act, particularly Articles 158 to 162 of the EC Treaty (Title 17), made it 
clear that cohesion was required for balanced development and to decline the 
backwardness of the least favored regions.67 The achievement was based on 
coordination of economic policies, implementation of the single market and 
allocation of the structural and cohesion funds. It incorporated the policy into the EC 
Treaty. Through this act, regional policy was accepted as an objective to achieve 
economic and social cohesion.  
           To conclude, economic and social cohesion employs the reduction of regional 
problems within the European outlook in order to promote solidarity, convergence 
and competitiveness. 
 
           3.2 A Chronological Review of The Regional Policy68 
           Regional considerations have been important since the creation of the 
European Community.  The Treaty of Rome in 1957 implied that there was a need to 
promote a unified development in Europe to eliminate the differences between 
various regions. As a result, in 1958 the Community established two funds, namely 
the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Agricultural Guidance and 
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Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).69 They allocated resources to the least developed regions. 
But it was not until the mid-1970s that specific measures of the regional policy were 
introduced. This decision was in fact related with the first enlargement. Historically 
speaking, when the former six countries created an integrated zone in the Europe, 
regional policy was not one of the major policies as these countries did not have any 
regional problems. However, this atmosphere changed with the first enlargement in 
1973 when the UK, Denmark and Ireland were included in the European integration 
process. Although Denmark and UK did not pose any instability for the European 
economies, Ireland had some underdeveloped regions.70 Oil crises during the 1970s 
have triggered international stagflation. Consequently, the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) was established in 1975. This was worthy in the sense 
that the EU started to give much more emphasis to the problems of its members.  
           The second and the third enlargement showed that an efficient regional 
adjustment was necessary in order to build a united Union. Greece, Spain and 
Portugal were poorer than existing members, causing budgetary problems.71 So, the 
Single European Act in 1986 “lays the basis for a genuine cohesion policy designed 
to offset the burden of the single market for the southern countries and other less-
favored regions.”72 Afterwards, in the Maastricht Treaty which established the 
cohesion fund, it was decided that cohesion was one of the main objectives of the 
EU. Through the financial package, the least developed regions were assisted in 
solving their environmental and transportation problems. More specifically, Greece, 
Spain, Ireland and Portugal were given financial help in order to prepare their entry 
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into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) because these countries could not 
meet the convergence criteria without support.73 As there were some disturbances in 
the fisheries industry during the 1990s, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance (FIFG) was established in 1993.  
           Amsterdam Treaty in 1995 included specific measures to combat 
unemployment in the regions. A new financial framework for 2000-2006 was 
accepted in the Berlin European Council in 1999, thanks to Agenda 2000 that put 
new objectives for the cohesion and structural Funds.74 Actually, this new reform 
process relied on budgetary burdens that would come with the accession of ten new 
members in the EU. Central and Eastern European Countries’ GDP per capita were 
lower than the current members and it was one half of the poorest countries like 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland.75 In reality, they were faced with structural 
difficulties. To be more specific, 22 % of their labor was employed in the agricultural 
sectors. This implied that they would receive more funds and agricultural subsidies 
from the EU. Due to these facts, the new financial framework was accepted although 
some member states such as Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden who 
were the contributors into the budget were dissatisfied.  
           The Lisbon Strategy was adopted in 2000 with the idea of making the EU “the 
most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, 
and respect for the environment” by 2010.76 Economic challenges coming from Asia 
and the improvements in the information and communication technology headed by 
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the US were the reasons for Lisbon. The major goals were the diffusion of 
technology, promotion of economic growth in trade by completing the single market, 
ameliorating qualifications of the employees through training and education along 
with implementing new policies in labor market participation and carrying out 
necessary reforms for businesses. 
           New financial regulations for the period 2007-2013 were proposed by the 
Commission in 2004. All these regulations are important to enhance convergence, 
regional competitiveness, employment as well as territorial cooperation. The 
Commission detailed its objectives for the regional policy until 2013. 
 
                 3.3 The Necessity And Principles of The European Regional Policy 
           This section provides an analysis of the European regional policy by covering 
its goals and objectives on a wider scale. 
 
            3.3.1 Why Regional Policy Is Needed? 
            It is appropriate to start this section with a question. If all of the member 
states have their own regional regulations, why it is necessary for the EU to construct 
special measures under the European regional policy? In reality, there are many 
grounds. To introduce a modern market economy, national and political stability and 
to eliminate negative disturbances like socio-economic problems mainly in the 
peripheral regions, intervention is necessary.77 It is not only economic assistance to 
backward areas but also a helping system targeting people like the unemployed and 
the workers. With the idea of efficiency and equity, social and economic inclusion in 
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mind, regional policy is a very helpful precaution for the continuity of welfare within 
the EU.  
           After drawing a general formula, it is now convenient to determine the 
specific reasons of the regional policy. As it was described in the overview part, the 
enlargement strategy of the EU was one of the reasons for the need of a European 
regional policy. During the first and second enlargement, economic imbalances in the 
member states caused budgetary burdens. The Northern enlargement was less 
problematic compared to the other ones. While examining the fifth enlargement 
strategy, it was visible that a majority of ten members caused agricultural, economic 
turbulences and they were seen as potential dangers for the future of the EU because 
budgetary expenditures increased automatically due to their structural problems.  
           As the EU is far from being a homogeneous structure, the enlargement 
strategy negatively affects the decision to promote integrity and stability between its 
members. Its heterogeneity along with the economic and social turbulences that some 
countries experienced is the most important point behind the establishment of an 
effective regional policy.  
           Three major challenges that the EU faced with can be implied as other reasons 
to implement regional policy.78 The Union should focus more on reducing regional 
disparities because there are new candidate countries who’s GDP per capita are 
lower than many of the current members. The growing competition with the 
liberalization attempts of the twenty first century is another danger for the future of 
the regional policy. Problematic regions will lose their attractiveness. As a response, 
the EU helps disadvantaged regions in improving their modernization process. The 
third danger is the technological and information revolution. Many of the regions do 
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not have enough research and development facilities and they are not able to adapt to 
new technological changes. That’s why the responsibility of the EU is to create an 
innovative society. 
           To be more specific, it is useful to give some examples to understand the first 
challenge. Today the EU has more than 450 million citizens. With the accession of 
ten new members, regional problems become more serious. The GDP per capita in 
ten members are approximately less than half of the average of EU-15.79 
Additionally, unemployment rates vary while examining different countries. It is 
only 2 % in Tyrol (Austria), 29 % in Réunion Island (France) and 26.3 % in 
Lubuskie (Poland). These illustrations give a clear impression about the unequal 
income distribution between different areas.  
           Some theoretical approaches also explain the intentions behind the regional 
policy. The solidarity argument states that poor member states of the EU are not 
capable of solving their regional problems; so the EU provides necessary resources 
to these countries. There are some inequalities between different regions. There are 
not only economic disturbances in the marginalized regions but also a huge gap 
between the centre and the periphery. The vested interest argument underlines that 
any reduction of regional disparities in one country can affect the other’s situation 
positively.80 This is related with the spillover thesis which gives emphasis to 
integration by pointing out that success in one sector leads to cooperation in other 
industries. As a result, there will be a win-win type of situation. Additionally, the 
effects of other EU policies argument denotes that benefits of enlargement and other 
policies do not seem profitable for every country. In response, the EU establishes a 
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redistribution mechanism to assist poorer countries. The compensation of the losses 
is the main argument.  
           In sum, the European regional policy is a significant attempt in preparing its 
members to the pressures coming from globalization. It is basically an efficient 
strategy for the EU to be a global player in the world. 
 
           3.3.2 Objectives of The Regional Policy 
           EU regional policy aims to reduce economic and social cliffs. In order to 
promote territorial cohesion, it should pick up peripheral areas. EUROSTAT (the 
Statistical Office of the European Commission) is responsible in the definition of the 
marginalized regions. This classification is made through the Nomenclature des 
Unités Territoriales Statistiques (NUTS).81 There are three levels of desegregation 
such as NUTS-1 which consists of the EU regions, NUTS-2 which is comprised of 
the provinces and finally NUTS-3 which includes arrondissements. The EU allocates 
funds to the selected regions through this system. 
           Regional policy is based on solidarity with the aim of financial support 
through different funds available for the backward regions. Between 2000 and 2006 
the EU spent one third of its budget, 213 billion euros for the selected regions. The 
Commission guidelines until 2006 can be summarized under three headings.82 The 
first objective is to improve regional competitiveness. The achievement is based on 
several factors. Firms need modern infrastructure, renewable source of energy, good 
telecommunication services and technological adaptation to operate in overseas 
markets and to become more profitable. Along with the Objective 1 and 2 of the 
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Agenda 2000, the EU provides financial assistance to the less favored areas. The 
second objective of this strategy is to increase the employment level. Combating any 
discrimination based on sex or religion, creating new job opportunities for the 
citizens and training are the basic goals. The EU provides help under Objective 3 
which includes: 
       “-basic and life-long training, apprenticeships  
        -support for employment and unwaged work  
        -the social economy  
        -improved structures of education, training and aid for employment  
        -the creation of partnerships between training institutions and firms  
        -helping workers to become flexible and adaptable  
        -equal opportunities”83 
 
 
           The third objective is to ameliorate the conditions in rural and urban areas. A 
clean and cheap transport system and a renewable source of energy are the 
necessities in big cities because they have some problems such as wastes. Urban 
areas are faced difficulties. Some of them are the lack of infrastructure, services, new 
technology to implement mainly in the agricultural industries and fisheries. Due to 
this fact, new strategies in producing high quality products as well as production 
techniques to modernize urban and rural areas are tried to be enhanced by the EU. 
           The Lisbon strategy adopted in 2000 was revised in 2005 because it could not 
meet its priorities fully. The economic growth of the European countries was not 
successful, there were still environmental problems and the EU was involved in some 
trade disputes with the US.84 Moreover, there were external challenges related with 
the US and Asian economies. China’s goods with cheaper prices, its rapid 
industrialization process together with the US leadership in Information and 
Communication  Technologies were the reasons of this revision.85 There were also 
some internal dangers like low birth rates and an aging population. The enlargement 
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strategy of the EU makes the Lisbon targets more difficult. As these threats were 
inevitable, in the European Council in 2005 the EU revised the Lisbon strategy. It 
was certainly crucial in realizing economic growth, employment, competitiveness, 
scientific development, increasing European attractiveness, creation of better 
business standards and environmental sustainability. It was also fateful for the EU in 
meeting its objectives under the regional policy because Lisbon targeted economic 
and social cohesion. As growth, productivity, employment, research and 
development level were lower than the expectations, the renewed Lisbon strategy 
focused on two priorities; growth and employment that are the important objectives 
in achieving cohesion. For a more Lisbon oriented regional policy, the Commission 
adopted new priorities for the regional policy in its Third Report on Economic and 
Social Cohesion that was based on convergence, competitiveness and employment 
and territorial cooperation from 2007 to 2013.86 Convergence is based on 
employment and job creation both in the member sates and in the less favored 
regions whose GDP is less than 75 % of the average. Regional competitiveness and 
employment refers to the achievement of economic growth, full employment and 
social cohesion in assisting the depressed areas and people together. Territorial 
cooperation targets transnational balanced development. If there is any problem in 
cross-border activities of the member states, some important solutions should be 
undertaken by the EU.  
           In line with these new strategies, the Council adopts Community strategic 
guidelines on cohesion for the period 2007-2013 that focus on different factors: 
                        “-improving the attractiveness of Member States, regions and cities by improving  
                        accessibility, ensuring adequate quality and level of services, and preserving their 
                        environmental potential; 
                        -encouraging innovation, entrepreneurship and the growth of the knowledge 
                        economy by research and innovation capacities, including new information and  
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                        communication technologies;  
                        -creating more and better jobs by attracting more people into employment  
                        entrepreneurial activity, improving adaptability of workers and enterprises and 
                        increasing investment in human capital.”87 
 
           These are the basic principles of the EU regional policy aiming to solve the 
negative imbalances, social and economic exclusion to create a more integrated 
Europe. 
 
3.4 Funds of The European Regional Policy  
 
           EU allocates structural and cohesion funds to its member countries. They act 
like basic mechanisms to eliminate the problems of various regions. They have a 
considerable place in the regional policy because resource allocation is promoted 
through these funds. Structural funds consist of the European Social Fund (ESF), the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG). From 2000 to 2006 the total money granted reached 213 billion euros.88 18 
billion euros was delivered through the cohesion fund. When looking at the period of 
2007-2013 the resource allocation for the structural and cohesion funds is about 308 
billion euros which is almost 36 % of overall EU spending. With the 2004 
enlargement, the EU desired to absorb its new members by creating new funds in 
helping the underdeveloped regions such as the Instrument for Structural Policies for 
Pre-accession (ISPA) and Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (SAPARD). There are also special programmes in implementing the 
regional policy. The first one is Interreg III that enhances cross-border, transnational 
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cooperation which is financed by the ERDF.89 Urban II is also financed by the ERDF 
and it focuses on innovation. Leader+ financed by the EAGGF tries to obtain new 
local strategies for rural areas and undertakes agricultural measures. The final 
initiative is Equal that emphasizes the elimination of discrimination and negative 
conditions in the labor market. The ESF finances this project. 
 
 
           3.4.1 Principles of The Funds 
 
           Principles of the funds are associated with the implementation of the regional 
policy which passes beyond several stages. Three rounds of reform package were 
issued. The first one took place in 1988, the second reform was made in 1993 and 
Agenda 2000 architected the final framework to coordinate the financial instruments 
in 1999.90  
           There are actually five different types of principles like co-ordination, 
concentration, programming, additionality and partnership. The co-ordination 
principle combines all of the EU instruments within a single framework. During the 
1988 reforms there were six conditions for the regions in obtaining funds but Agenda 
2000 made them only three. Principles under 1988 structural fund reforms were: 
        “-Objective 1: Development and structural adjustment of least-developed regions 
        -Objective 2: Conversion of regions facing industrial decline 
        -Objective 3: Combating long term unemployment 
        -Objective 4: Combating youth unemployment 
        -Objective 5a: Adjustment of agricultural structures 
        -Objective 5b: Development of rural areas 
        -Objective 6: Help low population density regions”91 
 
           1988 reforms were related with the enlargement package of the EU that 
welcomed Greece, Spain and Portugal as new members. Their entry created some 
danger for the implementation of the single market as they suffered economically. 
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So, the main objective was to reduce the difficulties of the member states and the 
Delors 1 budget package was adopted in February 1988 with the desire of making a 
new formulation in the cohesion policy.92 It was also doubled the budget allocated to 
structural funds. In 1992, the Commission proposed the Delors 2 budget package that 
was accepted in July 1993. This raised the funds allocated to both Objective 1 and 3 
regions and increased the proportion of the structural funds coming from the 
budget.93  
           The third reform was issued with Agenda 2000 by enhancing member states’ 
role in the administrative process and by simplifying the monitoring procedure. 
However, it did not increase the overall spending for the structural funds. This 
reform decision created confusions between member states, especially in Germany, 
the Netherlands, the UK, Sweden, Austria.94 They stated that they did not want to 
increase their budgetary contribution. They were opposed to this decision by 
denoting that this would lead to injustice because with the accession of new countries 
current member’s share from the budget would dramatically decrease. Germany 
decided to decrease its own contribution to the budget. Finally, new principles under 
Agenda 2000 were accepted and they could be summarized as follows: 
                        “-Objective 1: Promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions 
                        whose development is lagging behind (for regions below the 75% threshold of  
                         the EU GDP per capita) 
                        -Objective 2: Supporting the economic and social conversion of areas facing  
                        structural difficulties (industrial and rural areas with high long term  
                        unemployment and or high poverty levels) 
                       -Objective 3: Adapting and modernizing policies and systems of education,  
                        training and employment”95 
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           Objective 1 combines former principles 1 and 6, Objective 2 includes old 
principles 2 and 5b and Objective 3 brings together principles 3, 4 and 5b of the 1988 
reform.  
           After giving a summary of the different packages under the coordination 
principle, it is convenient to move into the other principles of the structural funds. 
The concentration principle’s basic aim is to assist priority areas, namely regions 
facing huge difficulties containing the poorest regions in general terms.96 This shows 
that financial help covers the underdeveloped regions of the EU. This objective can 
be also classified as a sub-heading of the co-ordination principle.  
           Programming refers to a set of arrangements in the distribution of structural 
funds through multi-annual programs and planned activities. This reflects especially 
a departure from financing on a project-by-project basis. In the 1988 regulations, the 
Commission was responsible to establish Community Support Framework (CSF) and 
Operational Programmes (Ops) after examining regional development plans which 
were conducted by the regional authorities. The expenditures under CSF were mainly 
dominated by Productive Investment Support, Human Capital Formation and 
Infrastructural activities.97 However, new directives reduce the role of the 
Commission because member states are given the possibility to submit their single 
programming document. So, countries have greater voice in the implementation of 
the programming principle now by identifying their own needs. 
           The additionality principle is a kind of complementary assistance project 
which takes into consideration that funds should not substitute the countries’ 
expenditures for their own national development efforts. It is an additional help 
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system for member states. The EU is still facing some problems in implementing this 
principle due to the disputes during the negotiation process. 
           The final principle of the structural funds is partnership. It is actually a 
consultation between the Commission, member states as well as local, national and 
regional authorities in the context of regional development plans. Many of the public 
and private actors are involved in the decision making process. The 1999 regulations 
gave clear division of competence between different partners. The Commission’s 
position can be described as a supervisory role because it controls those relevant 
funds which should be spent to reduce regional disparities between various regions 
of the EU. 98  
           The partnership principle is related with the idea of “Europe of the Regions” 
because there are not only states but different regional authorities are also dominant 
for regional development activities and measures. Furthermore, it puts enhanced 
participation of the regional and social representatives in the implementation process 
to improve transparency and effectiveness. Europe of the Regions basically means 
that the subnational substances have a greater to say in the socio-economic events. It 
also suggests that the regions rather than the nation states can be more powerful in 
the decision making mechanism.99  
 
           3.4.2 Structural Funds  
 
           There are regional socio-economic differences between the core and periphery 
areas of the EU that makes it inevitable to intervene through financial assistance. 
There should be more solidarity, equal distribution of opportunities and similar 
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welfare gains. Hence, structural funds are created in order to narrow economic and 
social gaps. There are four different funds. 
           The first one is the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) which was 
established in 1975. Its goal is to ensure economic and social cohesion by reducing 
regional problems through investments for job creation, infrastructure, education and 
health for Objective 1 regions. Assistance is allocated to small and medium sized 
enterprises along with the technological transfer, investment measures, local and 
employment development activities.100 For the period 2000-2006 it supports new 
Objective 1 and 2 regions, Interreg III and Urban II activities. For urban and rural 
regions dependent on fisheries under Objective 1, the ERDF helps their 
modernization process with investments for transport, telecommunication and 
energy. Equality between men and women, increasing competitiveness and 
innovative activities are also supported by the ERDF.  
           The European Social Fund (ESF) was established in 1957 and its major policy 
is to diffuse employment opportunities within the Union. It undertakes some various 
measures in increasing the employment level such as policies towards avoiding long-
term unemployment. So, it encourages workers returning to work and young persons. 
It focuses on social integration with equal job opportunities, reinforcing education 
and training activities, creating high quality employees by encouraging human 
involvement in science and technology, increasing women’s role in enterprises along 
with eliminating exclusion in the labor market.101 Through 2000-2006, the European 
Employment Strategy which is included in Agenda 2000 is supported with this fund. 
It allocates funds to Objective 1, 2 and 3 zones and Equal program. 
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           The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) 
constitutes almost 40 % of the EU budget and it is one of the most important funds 
which emerged in 1962.102 It is divided into two ranges namely the Guarantee and 
Guidance. The Guarantee section is based on the activities involved in the Common 
Agricultural Policy areas. It supports this crucial policy of the EU. The Guidance 
deals with the reform packages in the least developed regions in rural areas. It 
promotes agricultural measures namely modernization techniques and product-
oriented activities like marketing, reduction of spending, launching high quality 
products and forests-supported policies. In fact, the fund is responsible for the 
enhanced opportunities in depressed zones. It allocates funds to Objective 1 regions 
and supports the Leader program.  
           The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) tries to advance the 
competitiveness of the fisheries industries, works for sustainable development for the 
areas dependent on fisheries and aquaculture.103 In other words, it works for the 
Common Fisheries Policy. Between 2000 and 2006 the fund provides some structural 
measures like innovative precautions for coastal areas, fleets, fishing vessels and 
ports. It also operates for the improvement of product quality, promotion and 
revitalization techniques. Objective 1 regions are financed by this fund.  
           Under the objectives of Agenda 2000, 70 % of the regional spending goes to 
Objective 1 regions which include 22 % of the EU population.104 11.5 % of the 
structural funds are given to Objective 2 zones refer 18 % of the member states. For 
Objective 3 regions 12.3 % of financial provisions are provided. 
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           3.4.3 The Cohesion Fund 
           Since 1994 the Cohesion Fund makes arrangements in environment and 
transport infrastructure through financing eligible projects. Environment oriented 
eligibility depends on projects of reforestation, erosion control, drinking-water 
supply and the treatment of wastewater. Member states should have to fulfill two 
types of criteria in order to be assisted. First of all, member states’ GNP per capita 
should be less than 90 % of the EU average. If their GNP reaches more than 90 % of 
the average financial provisions are suspended. Secondly, member states that “have a 
programme leading to the fulfillment of the conditions of economic convergence as 
set out in Article 104c of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(avoidance of excessive government deficits)”105 are eligible for assistance. Until 
2004 Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal were countries that benefited from the 
financial assistance. But in 2003, Ireland was described as ineligible. With the 
accession of the ten new member states in the EU, all of these countries namely 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia are involved in these two criteria. 
  
           3.4.4 The Community Initiatives 
           The Community initiatives are special programs that cover specific policy 
areas since 1988 reforms of the structural funds and 5.35 % of the structural funds go 
to these funds.  
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           Interreg III is one of the basic mechanisms in stimulating balanced 
development through cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation.106 
For cross-border cooperation, the EU uses common development strategies. In order 
to vitalize transnational cooperation there should be more close links between the 
national, regional and local officials. Interregional integration depends on the 
establishment of regional networks to exchange information and expertise. 
           Leader +’s position in the development of rural measures as a second pillar of 
the Common Agricultural Policy is important because it seeks to ameliorate 
integrated rural development activities through sharing of information and 
experience via different networks.107 It also supports transnational and regional 
cooperation. 
           Urban initiative which is one of the element to diffuse innovation within the 
EU, focus on the restructuring of urban areas with the purpose of economic and 
social welfare and sustainable development for declining areas.108 
           Equal’s actions are related with the social aspects of the European regional 
policy with the aim of eliminating non-discrimination and inequality. New policy 
measures, methods to improve employment facilities are all supported by Equal.  
 
           3.4.5 The Pre-Accession Funds 
           The pre-accession funds were dedicated to Central and Eastern European 
countries in order to prepare them to membership. Later, it diffused to other states. 
There are three funds namely the PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA. 
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           Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) 
programme focuses on institution building for all industries and investment support 
for regional development.109 Institution building refers to the achievement of 
promoting democratic institutions, strengthening administrative and management 
systems and training public officials with the aim of efficient implementation of the 
acquis communautaire. PHARE’s role is very important because it is linked to the 
structural funds and it guides countries in resource allocation. 
           The Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(SAPARD) is created for the implementation of the acquis in the agricultural 
industries with a prospect of solving difficulties in rural and agricultural areas.110 For 
the Common Agricultural Policy purposes, this fund increases the amount of 
investment, health control of food quality, environmental protection for agricultural 
products. In rural areas the responsibility is to improve the rural infrastructure and 
forestry with the aim of protecting the rural areas. It also covers some other methods 
to apply better rural and agricultural strategies. 
           As a part of the pre-accession strategy, Instrument for Structural Policy for 
Pre-accession (ISPA) is influential in environment and transport policies of the EU 
because it checks that the EU environmental law and accession partnership strategy 
are being properly managed by the candidate countries.111 Environmental and 
transport infrastructure projects of the candidates are supported. It also upgrades the 
ties between the national and trans-European transport connections. 
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        3.5 New Regulations for 2007-2013 
        “As to the future, the task is not to foresee it, but to enable it.” 
                                                                                       Antoine de Saint-Exupéry  
           This quotation points out that with the European regional policy, the EU tries 
to promote balanced development. For this purpose, the most important strategy is to 
develop new opportunities because there are many internal and external challenges. 
To enhance common solutions to negative socio-economic imbalances, the Union 
makes some regulations in the regional policy. 
           In 2004, The European Commission adopted a new financial framework for 
the period 2007-2013. The major goal is to achieve growth and competitiveness 
which are parts of the Lisbon and Gothenburg decisions.112 Financial assistance will 
be provided for territorial development activities including modernization of local 
and rural areas. The EU will work also for institutional development. At this point, 
policy-making directives are noticeable in boosting regional cohesion. 
           Three new priorities are added to the objectives of the EU regional policy and 
the total money granted is EUR 308.041 billion. The first objective is convergence 
that includes the Objective 1 regions whose development is lagging behind. 
Convergence aims to promote growth and job creation and “the total resources 
allocated to this objective are EUR 251.163 billion, equivalent to 81.54 % of the 
total.”113 
           Regional competitiveness and employment is the second priority. It covers the 
richer member states rather than the peripheral regions in promoting 
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entrepreneurship, innovation and major labor market measures.114 Employment 
initiatives are based on the implementation of the European Employment Strategy 
aiming at adaptability and access to work places and social inclusion. The financial 
resources for this regional competitiveness and employment objective are EUR 49.13 
billion in total, that corresponds to 15.95 %. 
           The final provision is territorial cooperation which comprises Interreg regions. 
This will be accomplished through effective problem solving techniques in 
neighboring countries. In fact, the establishment of small and medium size 
enterprises is important. The EU will work for cross-border and transnational 
cooperation. EUR 7.75 billion, that is 2.52 % of the total will be provided for this 
objective.115 
           Under convergence, the structural funds are designed to give support to 
depressed areas whose GDP per capita is less than 75 % of the EU average while the 
cohesion fund will provide resources to the areas whose GNP per capita is lower than 
90 % of the average. For regional competitiveness and employment criteria, the 
structural and cohesion funds will be allocated for the regions that can not be placed 
under the convergence objective. With the purpose of territorial cooperation, the EU 
will help the regions “which are situated along internal land borders, certain external 
land borders and certain regions situated along maritime borders separated by a 
maximum of 150 km.”116 
           After examining the structural and cohesion funds, it is necessary to give 
information about the new regulations for the pre-accession funds. These funds, 
thanks to the new financial structure for the period 2007-2013, are replaced with the 
                                               
114
 Ibid. 
115
 Ibid. 
116
 Ibid. 
 52 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).117 It helps both the candidates and 
potential candidate countries together. It is designed to facilitate the regional 
cooperation, economic and social cohesion, institution building with respect to the 
fundamental freedoms, rule of law and non-discrimination. It is divided into five 
main principles like the support for transition and institution-building, the cross-
border cooperation, the regional development, the human resources improvement and 
the rural development.  
           All of these adjustments are required because with the accession of new 
member states, the EU has 27 members causing challenges for the future of 
economic and social cohesion. The income gap between the richest and poorest 
members are more than doubled and since 2001 there is an economic recession in 
many of the European countries.118 Furthermore, technological revolution, 
globalization and innovative actions make financial support inevitable. As the EU 
wants to be a global player as well as the most competitive, dynamic knowledge-
based society by 2010, there should be a new reform. 
           In sum, economic and social cohesion which is a part of the EU regional 
policy targeting to reduce disparities between its members by providing 
modernization activities in marginalized regions, job creation, harmonious 
development, education facilities, better standards of living, economic stability, 
social inclusion and other necessary strategies to combat with unemployment and 
discrimination is vital in eliminating the negative pressures coming from the 
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enlargement. As regional solidarity constitutes a worthy part of the regional policy, 
in order to vitalize convergence and competitiveness the EU puts some measures like 
structural policies, macroeconomic coordination and budgetary transfers. It provides 
structural, cohesion, pre-accession funds and Community initiatives. Put differently, 
funds are dedicated to member states which experience income or other type of 
economic and social imbalances.  
           Although the regional policy is a beneficial tool in decreasing the disturbances 
of the member states, the socio-economic trends should be analyzed in order to see 
the results of this cohesion policy. A detailed outlook is required to understand what 
is being achieved. The next chapter will show the past and recent trends. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRENDS IN 
AN ENLARGED EU 
 
 
 
 
           4.1 Partial Analysis of the Cohesion Reports 
 
           This section is a brief analysis of the four reports on economic and social 
cohesion which gives a clear impression about the negative effects of the EU 
enlargement strategy on regional policy because the basic trends from 1996 to 2006 
show that there is not only a lack of solidarity but also regional disparities increase 
with the accession of new members to the EU. 
  
           4.1.1 First Cohesion Report 
           This report which was published in 1996 examines the statistics in the EU-15 
by finding answers to questions like what the impact of the structural measures is and 
whether there is balanced development that leads to lower the gap between different 
countries. 
           While examining the economic figures, it was evident that there was a growth 
by 2 % per year and employment levels increased by 0.5 % a year since 1983.119 This 
was related with the rapid recovery of the poorest member states namely Spain, 
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Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Although economic growth had been achieved, the 
employment rates underlined that there was a problem because in Finland, Sweden, 
Spain and Greece the job creation and employment opportunities were below than 
expected. Women’s participation in the workforce was lower than men and this 
implied that women were employed in the low skilled jobs and they were excluded. 
           To be more specific, some employment figures should be given to show the 
gap between different countries. Unemployment rates on average became 11 % in the 
EU in 1995 while it was only 6 % in the US and 3 % in Japan.120 Both in 
Luxembourg and Austria, the unemployment rate was less than 5 % but in Spain and 
Finland the level was almost 15 %. In my opinion, the EU was far from being a 
global player during the 1990s without solving its regional disturbances because 
there was a cliff between various countries in terms of economic and social 
development.  
           Although the general outlook for job opportunities was negative, regional 
regulations to promote cohesion were satisfying as the inflation level and the interest 
rates diminished. Research and development expenditures were increased, especially 
by the richest member states.121 These achievements promoted a sustainable 
environment to attract foreign investors. In reality, country specific measures could 
not improve the quality of life due to the small distribution of budgetary means for 
regional development in the member states. 
           According to the European officials, the contribution of the EU structural 
policies in economic and social cohesion via providing financial assistance to the 
least developed regions and depressed areas were estimated to narrow the gaps 
between the richest and poorest members. The modernization incentives, the job 
                                               
120
 Ibid, Chapter 2, The Convergence Process and Cohesion: Recent Trends, 19. 
121
 Executive Summary, op. cit, 6.  
 56 
creation facilities and the innovative-based activities which were encouraged through 
the distribution of the structural funds would solve the regional problems.122 
Although they knew that there were some challenges that the EU should cope with 
like the enlargement, the report did not give any solutions to the common problems 
or in other words there were no specific measures that was designed to tackle the 
regional difficulties. Only the report pointed out that the focus was on job creation, 
non-discrimination between sexes, environmental protection and competitiveness.123 
For better employment opportunities, the EU supported the establishment of Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprises and to increase member states’ competitiveness; 
infrastructure, investment and innovation support were enhanced by the EU. 
Environmental protection was tried to be realized via following environment-friendly 
policies. Equal opportunities for men and women were supported with the creation of 
the NOW (New Opportunities for Women) initiative in 1991.124  
           To conclude, from the first to the third enlargement, the objectives of the 
regional policy could not be fulfilled because there was not any sufficient increase in 
the employment level and territorial development could not be achieved. “The main 
challenges were how to target scarce resources better on the most serious problems, 
optimize the use of grants and loans and public and private funding, and simplify 
procedures and strengthen subsidiarity.”125 So, there was a gradual economic 
recovery but social cohesion could not be achieved. 
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             4.1.2 Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion 
           Before examining this report, it is more suitable to focus on the Sixth 
Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of Regions 
in the European Union in order to show that the accession of the Central and Eastern 
European countries constituted an obstacle in the functioning mechanism of the 
regional policy. Although they did not participate in the EU when this report was 
published in 1999, it was evident that they would cause dangers. The transformative 
actions in these countries were reflected positively in their economic potential but in 
terms of regional imbalances and unemployment, more specific arrangements were 
necessary. They were below the EU average in terms of GDP and employment. 
There was also a lack of investment in transport infrastructure and environmental 
protection.126  
           The second report which was published on 31 January 2001 examined the 
economic and social cohesion within the members and drew a picture of the EU-27. 
The report implied that the income disparities between members narrowed in recent 
years and in the least developed countries, namely Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
income per head increased from 68 % of the EU average in 1988 to 79 % in 1999.127 
Territorial imbalances and poverty remained as problems. However, with a Union of 
27 members, the regional disparities would automatically rise because the candidate 
countries (CEECs) were dependent on agriculture, labor productivity was lower than 
the EU-15 and the rural population was higher. That’s why the enlargement would 
cause challenges in two ways. First of all, it would augment the population of 
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Objective 1 regions (whose GDP per capita was less than 75 % of the EU average) 
from 71 million to 174 million. Secondly, it would create economic difficulties by 
decreasing the income of the members. In 1998, the GDP per head of the less favored 
regions was 66% of the EU average but with the entry of new members the GDP of 
the marginalized regions would become 48 % of the EU average.128  
        The report gave a brief outlook to the EU-25 by stating that:  
        “-The eight candidate countries with the lowest per capita income (Poland, 
        Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Malta) 
        will have one fifth of the EU population but only 42 per cent of the per capita    
        GDP; 
        -Spain, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia and Cyprus will have 13 per cent of the total 
        EU population and an average 71 per cent of GDP per capita;  
        -The remaining 12 current Member States will account for 66 per cent of the total  
        EU population and 115 per cent of the EU average GDP per capita.”129 
 
           Socially speaking, the unemployment rate had “fallen from 10.7 % in 1997 to 
8.3 % in August 2000 and is set to fall below 8 % in 2001.”130 Although there was a 
progress, the statistics emphasized that the labor shortages were still a challenge for 
the socio-economic welfare. The labor market participation in the services sector 
grew and the jobs in agriculture and industry declined. The accession of the CEECs 
would automatically increase the agricultural population and employment. However, 
there were not any huge differences between the CEECs and the EU-15 in terms of 
employment statistics. While the unemployment level was 10.2 % in candidate 
countries, it was 9.3 % in the EU-15 in 1999.131 
           Poverty also was a problem that affected negatively the solidarity of the EU 
members. While in Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria the poverty 
was below the EU average, Portugal and Greece faced serious problems as almost 22 
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% of their population suffered.132 In fact, the EU should increase the amount of the 
social transfers to the unemployed, the retired and families with many children to 
solve this uncertainty. 
           While looking through the European Union’s main activities associated with 
the regional policy in the second report, it was clear that the amount of the structural 
funds dedicated to the member states doubled in recent years and the income gap of 
the Objective 1 regions decreased automatically. Moreover, in Objective 2 areas, 
unemployment rates diminished.133 The competitiveness of the current members 
were tried to be enhanced with careful measures for the development of SME’s, 
education and training, research and development, transport infrastructure. The 
creation of the European Spatial Development Perspective was important because the 
EU began to give emphasis to the urban development, cultural heritage of the EU 
regions, more infrastructure and know-how oriented concerns with the aim of 
harmonious development.134 The European Employment Strategy was also accepted 
in 1997. Its objectives were based on promoting employability, entrepreneurship, 
adaptability and equal opportunities.135 Unfortunately, due to the continuity of the 
unemployment problems, this strategy was not successful enough to combat with the 
long-term unemployment and to integrate the youth population into the labor market. 
           To conclude, it is not suitable to talk about real convergence when this report 
was launched because of the poverty problem and the negative effect of the possible 
accession of the CEECs. Furthermore, the young population under 15 fell and there 
was a growth in the number of the elderly people who are older than 65.136 This 
signifies that the social protection and the health-care systems would cause a 
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budgetary burden in the near future. So, the system of early retirement should be 
eliminated, the training opportunities for the older and the young people should be 
enhanced. The budgetary allocation for education should be improved to increase the 
number of the qualified people. Without finding any immediate solutions to the 
income and labor market related difficulties, it is impossible to create an ever closer 
union and to become a knowledge-based economy. 
 
           4.1.3 Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion 
           The third report which was published on February 2004 recorded that “the 
economic growth in the EU has slowed appreciably over the three years since the 
publication of the second Cohesion Report.”137 This was related with the structural 
problems such as the lack of physical, environmental and human capital, 
inefficiencies in the innovative actions.  
           The accession of the new members in the EU did not put an end to the 
regional imbalances. The number of people living in Objective 1 regions increased 
sharply and 55 million people was at the risk of poverty in 2000.138 This was a real 
danger as the budget distribution to social services, housing, health care and 
education would be less if these income problems continue. As a result, the social 
cohesion can not be achieved in most of the EU regions. The ageing of the 
population was still a problem and 64 % of the EU-15 citizens were employed. In the 
new accession countries this rate was only 56 %. 2003 statistics specified that 
unemployment rates were high in the CEECs especially in Poland with a share of 20 
% and it reached 16 % in Slovakia. In both Latvia and Lithuania it was more than 10 
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%. Only in Cyprus, unemployment did not pose any economic instability because it 
was only 4 %.139 The women’s participation in the economic activity also varied 
between countries. For example, working women in the Netherlands, Austria, UK 
and the Nordic countries were more than 60 % while in Spain, Greece and Italy this 
rate was below than the EU average.140   
           The factors that accelerate competitiveness which were especially based on 
qualified workers with an effective educational background, infrastructure 
endowment and innovation were not successfully implemented. Both in the rail 
network and in telecommunications, the modernization process should be enhanced 
because mainly in the new member states, there was a need to develop an effective 
formula. Other infrastructures like health facilities and social support systems were 
also needed to be revised. As the innovative reforms of a country increased its 
credibility and access to the new technologies was vital to be a global player in world 
markets, important steps should be conducted in order to decrease the gap between 
different regions.141 Due to these inefficiencies, the investment rate was not 
satisfactory. Although foreign direct investment contributed positively to the areas 
where economies were poor and it created jobs and higher level of incomes for the 
citizens, the amount of capital inflows was not sufficient in the member states.142 For 
example, in the period of 1999-2001, investment flows in Ireland were 21 % of its 
GDP but in Portugal it was only 4 % and in many other countries including Spain, 
Italy as well as Greece capital inflows were even lower. There were regional 
inequalities in terms of economic growth and all the member states could not benefit 
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from the foreign direct investment. Therefore the decision makers should adopt new 
policies to solve the economic difficulties of the EU members. 
           The report stated that a reformed cohesion policy was essential in solving the 
uncertainties coming from the enlargement. When the new countries joined into the 
Union, socio-economic disparities became a serious handicap and the GDP of the EU 
decreased by 12.5 %.143 Most of the good performers were also negatively affected 
by the economic slowdown. To be specific, Germany and Italy were faced economic 
troubles. In France and the Netherlands where the growth rates were high in the past, 
the economic recession caused damages in terms of GDP growth.144  However, the 
successful point was that there was an economic recovery in the four cohesion 
countries namely Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. The employment level was 
also augmented and there was a growth in productivity. Hence, the structural 
interventions in these countries were reflected positively in their economic growth.  
           In this context, it is useful to explain the challenges that the EU regional 
policy will face with the entry of the Central and Eastern European Countries. The 
structural deficiencies will grow automatically in the near future. It will be difficult 
to conduct a long-term development strategy due to the rise in the regional 
disturbances. As the depressed areas will be multiplied, it will become difficult to 
help the less favored regions. As a result, this will cause a burden to the EU budget.  
          To sum up, there is not a strong possibility that the new priorities of 
convergence, regional competitiveness and employment as well as territorial 
cooperation can accelerate the job creation, cross-bordered problem-solving, access 
to work places, stability and fair competition, higher standard of living and economic 
growth although there was an economic achievement in the cohesion countries. It is 
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estimated that the CEECs will put an obstacle to the regional development activities 
and integration process.  
 
           4.1.4 Fourth Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion 
           On 12 June 2006, the Commission published its fourth progress report 
emphasizing the importance of the convergence between member states and showing 
the disparities along with the new socio-economic developments. 
           While observing the growth rates, it was evident that in 2005 even in the 
developed member states the level of economic growth was less than 1 % per year.145 
In the EU-25, the rate was only 1,5 % a year. However, the new member states 
almost completed their economic recovery and the thirteen cohesion countries’ GDP 
was in a rising trend.  
           When analyzing the third and fourth progress reports on economic and social 
cohesion the employment statistics specified that that the EU made successful 
arrangements because in 2003, the employment rate in the EU-25 was 62.9 % and in 
2004 it reached 63.3 %. From 1998 to 2004, the EU created 10 million additional 
jobs but it was still away from the Lisbon target of employment which was 70 %. 
This meant that it should create 24 million more jobs.146  
           For research and development which is a key element of technological 
improvement and innovative actions only 35 regions had an expenditure fulfilling the 
Lisbon goals and “these 35 regions account for 46 % of total R&D expenditure in the 
EU27 – which is twice their share in GDP.”147 Conversely, in 47 regions, the total 
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spending covering research and development was below 0.5 % of GDP. There was 
also a huge gap in ICT expenditures between countries. The internet access was at a 
satisfactory target in the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden but it was 20 % in 
Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Greece in 2005.148 
            The optimistic point was that the EU began to extend its measures through 
new programmes such as JASPERS (Joint Assistance in Supporting Projects in 
European Regions), JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium 
Enterprises) and JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in 
City Areas) in order to create long term sustainability in the regions by providing 
grants, loans and technical expertise.149 
            
           4.2 A More Detailed Outlook 
           The first section makes a general assessment of the socio-economic trends by 
emphasizing the new regulations that are undertaken by the EU officials and the 
challenges of the fifth enlargement. A deeper outlook is necessary in order to see the 
influence of the each phase of enlargement. So, this section provides an analysis of 
the socio-economic trends under different headings from the 1970s to 2007. The 
main focus is on basic indices such as GDP, technological adaptation, employment, 
income, social inclusion, growth, education, job opportunities and labor market 
participation. 
 
                                               
148
 Ibid. 
149
 Ibid, 10-11. 
 65 
           4.2.1 Economic Performance 
           Regional economic development from the 1970s to the early 1990s was 
negative especially in terms of GDP. There were huge gaps between the members of 
the EU. In Greece the productivity level was 49 % of the EU average in 1991 
whereas Luxembourg’s productivity was 131 %.150 In general terms, Objective 1 
regions whose GDP per capita was below 75 % of the EU constituted more than 20 
% of regions but only 10 % of the total EU areas were recorded as good performers. 
           The four cohesion countries namely Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland 
which were the most problematic countries until the fourth enlargement succeeded to 
catch up with the other countries by decreasing their regional imbalances from 1960 
to 1996. However, they were still problematic regions. The level of investment in 
Greece was 22 % from 1956 to 1973 but it decreased to 18 % in the period of 1975-
1992. The picture in Spain and Portugal was more positive than that of Greece due to 
the necessary adjustments in the public sector and labor market. Ireland was the most 
fascinating country compared to other three in attracting the FDI in the late 1980s. 
This was based on its educated labor force, good infrastructural basis and efficient 
macroeconomic conditions since its participation to the European Monetary System 
although it experienced tough difficulties in the early 1980s. However, these were 
not the case for Greece.151  
           When analyzing the growth rates, it was evident that these four cohesion 
countries grew more than the rest of the EU between 1965 and 1975. Although this 
process slowed down in the early 1980s, rapid recovery was seen in Spain, Ireland 
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and Portugal for the period 1985-1990.152 The structural funds succeeded to shorten 
the regional imbalances for the Objective 1 areas of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, the 
Mezzogiorno of Italy and Spain.  
           The recent trends were different. The GDP rose by 1.5 % in 2001 compared to 
the 3.5 % in 2000 and even the four biggest economies such as the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy and Germany experienced low growth rates.153 The per capita GDP 
changes from 1999 to 2003 showed that the economic progress was dynamic in 
Greece and Spain but Poland, Cyprus, Malta, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria could 
not be efficient in the catching-up.154 However, in the period of 2000-2006 the GDP 
growth rates were similar between the EU-15 and EU-27 and among different 
countries the most noticeable progress was seen in the CEECs, mainly in Latvia with 
a share of 11.9 % and Estonia with 11.4 % in 2006. Slovakia and Romania were the 
followers but the forecasts underlined that this ascendant trend will terminate in 2007 
and 2008.155 Greece and Spain were higher than the average in 2006. 
           The most disappointing point was that although the CEECs’growth was 
successful, their share remained ineffective and there were still huge disparities 
between the EU members in terms of GDP per capita in PPS. The worst performers 
were Romania (34 %), Bulgaria (34 %), Latvia (49 %), Poland (50 %), Lithuania (52 
%) and Slovakia (57 %) in 2005. It should be equal to 100 and economically 
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speaking the CEECs were the losers. The winners were Luxembourg (251 %), 
Ireland (139 %), Netherlands (125 %), Austria (123 %) and Denmark (122 %).156  
           Inflation rates ranged from 7.4 % in Bulgaria to 6.6 % in both Latvia and 
Romania to 3.3 % in Greece to 2.6 % in Malta to 1.3 % in Poland and Finland in 
2006. In the EU average the inflation rate was 1.9 % in 2000 and it increased to 2.2 
% in 2006 with little variations between these periods.157 There were not any 
uncertainties affecting negatively the harmonius development. These indicators of 
growth, GDP and inflation emphasize that the former communist countries achieve 
to integrate with the EU-15 in terms of economic growth but this transformation 
process has still some costs because there is not any economic stability in the EU-27 
and the economic gap is still a concern, distorting the effectiveness of the regional 
policy.  
           In the autumn economic forecasts of 2006, the European Commission had 
optimistic expectations considering the economic growth by pointing out that it will 
be 2.8 % in 2006 and 2.4 % in 2007 but it was only 1.7 % in 2005 for the EU-25.158 
Headline inflation was above 2 % in the first quarter of 2006 and this was based on 
the rise in energy prices and unprocessed food prices. As the Commission puts it, it 
will be 2.1 % in 2007 and 1.9 % in 2008. The highest inflation rate among the euro-
zone members will be seen in Greece and Spain. Outside the euro area, the highest 
rates will be in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. But in general, inflation does not seem 
to pose a challenge for the EU as a whole. There will be a little improvement in the 
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investment level of Germany, Italy and Portugal. Ireland will be the most favored 
member in terms of productivity growth but in general this rate will be low in 2007. 
The budget balance data are quite interesting, illustrating that there are surpluses in 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands whereas Spain and the majority of the 
CEECs experience high deficits.159  
           There is a possibility that the majority of the ten CEECs would not participate 
in the euro zone area because of their economic instability. Member states should 
follow common economic criteria in order to be eligible. Countries should have price 
stability with low inflation which shouldn’t exceed 1.5 % of the best three 
performers, their public deficit should be below 3 % of the GDP and the value of the 
government debt should be around 60 % of the GDP. Moreover, they should have 
low interest rates (not more than 2 % points above the three leading countries).160 
The data prove that they are not ready to adopt the single currency because their 
current account deficits accelerated from 4.3 % of GDP in 2001 to 4.6 % in 2005. 
The high rates of unemployment, the low contribution to pensions and the need to 
rearrange the public financing system make these countries inefficient.161 Their 
isolation will affect the functioning of the regional policy negatively, causing a 
handicap for the harmonious development and regional competitiveness because the 
single currency allows free movement of goods, capital, labor and services by 
removing trade barriers in the euro zone. Member states benefit from market 
transparency and it becomes easier to compare business conditions as well as price 
comparisons in different countries which enable them to choose cheaper and well-
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produced goods. The reduction in the transaction and information costs allow firms 
to obtain higher profits as exchanging costs of one currency to another is 
eliminated.162 As a result, uncertain future movements of exchange rates disappear 
and the lower interest rates increase demand which lead to effective investment 
opportunities. Thanks to the one-size-fits-all interest rates strategy of the European 
Central Bank, the price stability is achieved simply by controlling the money supply 
and by monitoring prices that reduce inflation rates which reflect positively to 
economic efficiency.163 In this context, the possible delay of the CEECs to join in the 
euro zone area will be harmful for the regional competitiveness of the EU, 
deteriorating the gap between member states. 
 
           4.2.2 Social Cohesion 
           The 1960s and 1970s could be pointed out as the full employment period but 
these positive developments began to deteriorate in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Unemployment reached 10.9 % in 1996 whereas it was 9.8 % in 1987.164 The 
unemployment challenge was based on the balance of payments crisis, restrictive 
monetary policy, low investments and productivity. The regions that were mostly 
affected from the high unemployment were situated in Spain and southern Italy and 
the level was almost 22 %.165 “Whereas the proportion of people of working age in 
work reached 75 % in Denmark and south-east England and 70 % in southern 
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Germany in 1989, it was below 50 % in all of Spain, in Ireland and in much of 
southern Italy.”166 
           In this context, the industrial distribution of employment was crucial because 
the EU should give enough emphasis to industrialization in order to promote 
balanced development and to increase regional competitiveness. In 1990, agriculture 
played more noticeable role compared to industry in Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal 
and Italy. In the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany less than 5 % of the 
employment was in agriculture.167 As a result, the social integration of the four 
cohesion countries could not be accomplished and the major reason was the lack of 
industrialization. 
           Women’s participation in the labor force was another issue which caused a 
danger for social cohesion. Generally, it was high in the developed northern regions 
and low in the less favored southern areas but female employment increased also in 
some parts of the periphery. For example, Ireland, Spain, the south of France, Greece 
and southern Italy succeeded to raise the women’s share in the work places from 
1985 to 1989.168 However, the levels were not sufficient to prevent social isolation. 
           After the period of 1990s, it is now necessary to examine the new figures for 
the workforce. “The Lisbon strategy of 2000 sets the ambitious goal of achieving an 
employment rate of 70 % overall, 60 % for women and 50 % of older workers within 
the EU-25 by 2010.”169 In reality, there were many variations between the EU 
members. In Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK the labor market 
participation was above the Lisbon target in 2003. In Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
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Austria and Ireland unemployment was less than 5 %. Spain, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Poland were far from the Lisbon target. In Germany, France and Italy 
employment growths were in decreasing trends, especially in Germany long-term 
unemployment was a major challenge. In general terms, unemployment rates reached 
9 % in the EU in 2003.170 
           Before moving into the next topic, it is necessary to give some statistics in 
order to see the variations between different periods easily. The table below is an 
illustration that in 2006 the gap between the CEECs and the EU-15 diminished. This 
could be considered as a success but the main problem was that in both Poland and 
Slovakia unemployment remained a danger, distorting the social cohesion although 
there was a decrease compared to last years. In Poland, unemployment rate was 17.7 
% in 2005 and it became 13.8 % in 2006. Slovakia was also succeeding to reduce its 
unemployment level from 16.3 % in 2005 to 13.4 % in 2006. When comparing these 
data with other countries, there were not any members whose unemployment rates 
were more than 10 % in 2006 and the lowest values were seen in the Netherlands 
(3.9 %), Denmark (3.9 %), Ireland (4.4 %), Cyprus (4.7 %), Luxembourg (4.7 %) 
and Austria (4.8 %). Unemployment never became a danger for these several 
countries from 2000 to 2006. Latvia, Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania faced with 
severe labor market crisis in the past but they could lessen their unemployment 
figures in recent years.171 These imbalances proved that the special assistance 
programmes dedicated to the CEECs like PHARE, SAPARD and TACIS was not 
successful enough because while examining the data it was visible that the southern 
and eastern parts were the most affected regions.  
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Total 
Unemployment 
Rate ( % ) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-27 8.6 8.4 8.7 9.0 9.0 8.7 7.9 
EU-15 7.6 7.2 7.5 7.9 8.0 7.9 7.4 
Source:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,39140985&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
&screen=detailref&language=en&product=STRIND_EMPLOI&root=STRIND_EMPLOI/emploi/em071.  
          There were no any effective achievements in terms of female unemployment 
because in the EU-27 it was 10 % in 2000 and reached 8.8 % in 2006. Moreover, the 
level was unchanged from 2000 to 2004. Greece, Spain, Poland and Slovakia were 
the losers and Ireland and the UK were the winners.172 There was a sharp increase in 
the older workers’ (aged 55-64) participation in the workforce. Although it was only 
36.9 % in 2000, it amounted to 43.5 % in 2006. The 50 % target of the Lisbon goals 
was not achieved yet and only 8 countries namely Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, 
Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia, the UK and Finland exceeded the limit.173 As a result, older 
workers caused a problem in the EU because of the ageing population and low birth 
density. Therefore, they should participate more on the labor market. 
           The key policy to contribute positively to the employment growth laid down 
on qualified workers by investing on education. When looking at the EU, Europeans 
aged 25-34 who completed their upper secondary education were 77 % and this ratio 
dropped to 54% when looking at the elderly in 2004. However, there was not any 
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effective rise in the number of tertiary students from 1998 (14.4 million) to 2003 
(16.9 million).174 Lifelong learning remained a challenge because only 10 % of the 
EU members aged 24-64 was included in this process. In this context the government 
contribution of almost 5 % on education and training should be enhanced. If no 
country invests in education, it will be unrealistic to talk about better labor market 
performance, contributing positively to the economic improvement. Due to this 
reason, the EU should focus more on Objective 3 of Agenda 2000 which contains 
modernizing policies and the process of education, training and employment. 
           As regards social protection and health care services, the EU countries use 
diverse formulas for financing such as social security contributions via employers 
and protected persons as well as general government contributions. The protection 
system includes unemployment, disability, old age, social exclusion, health care and 
family benefits. Old-age, sickness and health care have the major share in the budget 
distribution because of the rise in the proportion of the older people and the lack of 
births that affect negatively the health benefit and pension systems.175  
           There was always a fluctuation in the social protection expenditures between 
1990 and 1999. From 1996 to 2000 the reduction continued in spending and it 
amounted to 27.3 % of GDP in 2000 in the EU-15 with the most apparent decline in 
Finland and Ireland.176 In 2003, the social protection expenditure amounted to 28.3 
% of GDP in the EU-15 and 28 % in the EU-25, thanks to the dominant contribution 
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of Sweden, France, Germany and Denmark. Unfortunately, the proportion was not 
that high in Ireland, Estonia and Spain.177   
           The poverty indices show that it is not suitable to talk about real social 
convergence in the EU-25. In reality, 16 % of the EU-25 population was at the risk 
of poverty in 2003 and the most affected part of the population was the women, older 
people and children.178 In most of the CEECs except Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Slovenia, poverty remained a problem. Greece, Ireland, Spain and Italy also 
were problematic areas.  
           To conclude, there is an improvement in the labor market strategies but there 
is a need to implement more active policies in investing the human capital, providing 
effective ageing policies, implementing better social protection systems. 
 
           4.2.3 Technological Adaptation 
           It is an accepted issue that technological progress depends on key factors such 
as qualified workers, research and development capacity of a country, innovative 
actions and outstanding infrastructural investments. By looking at the general 
framework in the 1990s, it was suitable to note that in the four cohesion countries the 
share of the Research and Development personnel was low compared to the most 
advanced regions. It was in fact connected to the insufficient level of large 
enterprises. Only in Ireland there was a progress because the country began to follow 
the Science and Technology Development Programme in 1987.179  
          The heterogeneity was also seen in the patents and publications area as well as 
R&D expenditures. While the share of the UK, France and Germany for the total 
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number of patents reached 80 %, there was not any adequate level of R&D facilities 
in the cohesion countries. 
           The conclusion which could be drawn from these realities was that for the 
Small and Medium Size Enterprises it was really hard to integrate into the R&D 
activities and as the number of these enterprises was high in the peripheral areas; 
many regions could not adapt the new technologic advancements. Additionally, the 
budget share of the R&D support is low, constituting only 5.5 % of the EU budget 
for Objective 1 areas from 1989 to 1993.180 
           The technological gap between the member states was evident in the 1990s. 
At this point, some suggestions can be given in order to improve the technological 
adaptation and to ensure regional competitiveness. The declining regions should be 
encouraged more and there should be more emphasis on the concentration and 
coordination principles of the European regional policy.181 
           Countries need modern infrastructure and investments because at the end it 
will promote productivity and convergence between the EU countries. The transport 
infrastructure statistics specified that the four cohesion countries were faced with 
hard conditions. Their national funding was not enough and this was the major cause 
of their transport infrastructure handicaps.182 
           As regards the recent years, the downturn continued. It is appropriate to 
compare some inputs in terms of R&D spending from 1995 to 2004 in order to 
understand whether or not the EU will be the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based society in the future. R&D expenditure relative to GDP was 1.81 
% in 1995 and there was a minor change in 2004 and it amounted to 1.86 % in the 
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EU-25.183 As the Lisbon target was 3 % of GDP, there were still some deficiencies in 
technological capacities, especially in most of the CEECs like Malta, Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia with a share of less than 1 % in general. The 
most developed countries were Sweden and Finland with above the target rate. In 
terms of R&D personnel in 2004, it was visible that they were situated in the capital 
regions, industrialized regions and the most developed countries. Bulgaria’s and 
Romania’s share were lower than the other countries and they were followed by 
Poland.184 The number of professionals or knowledge workers who are helpful for 
technological catch-up captured the highest levels in Sweden (Stockholm), the Czech 
Republic (Praha) and Germany (Utrecht) with a share of almost 50 %.  
           High-tech industries such as aerospace, computers, electronics, 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals and scientific instruments are vital for the technological 
progress by increasing the economic potential of the EU. According to 2004 
statistics, the share of employment in the high of medium-tech manufacturing was 
6.9 % in the EU-25 and Germany’s regions were the leaders with a share of 7.5 % in 
total employment.185 
           The patents application level was also low in the CEECs compared to other 
members. The EU-15 average was 160.65 million but in the EU-27 this rate was 
127.95 in 2003.186 Finland and Germany were the winners with an amount of 
305.603 million and 311.714 million respectively. They were followed by Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Sweden and the Netherlands. However, there were huge discrepancies 
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between the top and the bottom. To take an example, Romania’s share was only 
1.172 million and Bulgaria’s share was 4.306 million. Half of the CEECs patents 
application was also lower than 10 million.  
           Economic imbalances and industrial difficulties can be eliminated by 
investing more on infrastructure because this will promote easy access to the cities 
and will deepen the attractiveness of the EU countries. Transport is crucial in 
promoting safe standards and high quality services to the citizens. The liberalization 
of the air transport was successfully achieved in the 1990s; the number of air 
passengers between 2001 and 2003 was in an upward trend by 4.9 %. Road transport 
was also in a rising trend but there was a drop in the inland waterways and rail 
transport from 1995 to 2002. That’s why there should be some modernization 
procedures in order to revitalize these two industries.187 
           In telecommunications, the EU tries to build an information society by closing 
the gaps between its members. 51 % of the EU-25 members had access to the 
internet at home in 2005 and this ratio was 54 % in the EU-15. The spectacular point 
was that less than 20 % of the households in Romania and Bulgaria had internet 
access. Among the other members, the share of the Netherlands was 80 %, Denmark 
was 79 % and Sweden was 77 %.188 
           The final point was that there was a lack of physical and human capital in the 
EU and the capacity to invent was not that high. The position of the CEECs was not 
dynamic enough and the EU-25 was not efficient in creating a global knowledge-
based society because the total R&D expenditure ratio to GDP was almost 1.90 % in 
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2004 while it was 2.59 % in the US and 3.15 % in Japan.189 The number of qualified 
workers employed in technology-based enterprises constituted 0.85 % of total 
employment in 2004. Hence, the EU should give more priority to its technological 
investments. 
 
           4.3 An Overall Assessment 
           According to me, regional planning activities of the EU seem to be effective 
in terms of economic development for the four cohesion countries during the 1990s. 
This meant that from the first to the third enlargement economically poor countries 
were included in the integration process. However, this did not mean that they had 
stable economies without fluctuations. It was true that there was a recovery, but not 
in remarkable levels. Social integration can not be accomplished and the employment 
crisis began to ameliorate in the EU regions. The R&D potential was in a growing 
trend only in the core and infrastructure remained a handicap for the cohesion 
countries.   
           The lessons that could be drawn from 1990s were as follows: Spatial and 
thematic concentration could not create effectiveness, there was chaos in the 
concentration and coordination principle of the structural funds, emphasis on small-
scale projects was low and regional authorities did not have a great power in the 
decision-making.190  
           The recent news designate that the growth capacity of the EU has stayed far 
behind the expectations and even the most advanced countries experience low 
growth potential. Although there is a GDP growth in the CEECs, the basic indices 
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show that their GDP per capita in PPS is low. Budget deficits are alarming but the 
EU-25 would not face inflationary pressures in the near future.  
           Socially speaking, the most remarkable progress is seen in diminishing the 
unemployment level in recent years. Also, the gap between the CEECs and the EU-
15 is in a shrinking trend but Poland and Slovakia are still the most suffering 
countries. But, there should be arrangements to increase the employment rate of the 
older and female workers. The social protection systems should be rearranged 
because social exclusion becomes a challenge, distorting the cohesion and welfare of 
the EU by increasing the poverty and hurting the living standards. This is in fact 
related with the volatile and negative employment opportunities. If there is not any 
turbulence in the creation of new jobs, education-training strategies and in the 
participation of the workforce in the labor market, then social exclusion would not 
disrupt social stability. 
           As decreasing the number of the problematic regions and assisting the regions 
whose development are lagging behind are the strategies of the regional policy, 
ameliorating the conditions in technologically marginalized regions is necessary. The 
Cohesion Fund, the ERDF and the Urban Initiative should focus more on creating 
technological progress. The EU can be undertaken some initiatives to increase the 
R&D spending and there should be more infrastructural investments. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE EU-27 WITH 
REGARD TO REGIONAL POLICY 
 
 
  
            5.1 Central and Eastern European Countries as a Case Study 
            This section will serve to show various perspectives about the accession of 
the CEECs while providing a comparative study to find out whether the costs of 
enlargement outweigh its benefits. 
  
           5.1.1 Different Views for the Central and Eastern European Countries191 
           The fifth enlargement strategy, in general, is one of the most crucial 
paradigms to examine because it was different from the previous ones and it was 
seen as the most challenging integration due to the number of participants that raised 
questions about the absorption capacity as well as socio-economic disparities within 
these countries. There were also other reasons. 
           First of all, the CEECs were relatively poor compared to the current members 
which would cause budgetary turbulences. There was an economic downturn in some 
of the previous members and a result; they did not want to accept these countries as 
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new members because ultimately new countries would receive more assistance from 
the regional funds. 
           Secondly, they were historically different and among them there were newly 
independent countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. All of these countries were under Soviet control and with the 
end of the Cold War these communist countries tried to transform their economies.192 
In return, the Union provided financial assistance to these countries through specific 
programmes like PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD and Interreg. The purpose was to help 
their transformation process and to ameliorate the conditions in the agriculture and 
rural development sector, education, economic development, infrastructure and 
employment. Moreover, balanced development was tried to be enhanced through 
special funds. 
           The shock therapy or in other words big bang that included economic 
measures such as macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, price and trade 
liberalization facilitated their economic transition because the basic target of these 
programmes was to reduce inflation rates, to promote financial stability and to 
remove trade restrictions. As a result, they began to make an economic recovery at 
the end of the1990s. For example, “economic growth in most of the countries has 
averaged 3 per cent per annum, exceeding that recorded in the EU-15.”193 However, 
unemployment and inflation rates were higher than the EU-15 and there was a GDP 
problem in the CEECs. This environment continued during the 2000s. Although 
some current members of the EU such as Germany suffered economic difficulties, 
the growth rate of the CEECs on average was 2,9 % in 2002 and it was expected to 
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exceed 3 % in the following years. However, some problems like inflation and 
unemployment remained unsolved. Although there was a decline in the inflation rate, 
it was below the EU average. In addition, fiscal deficits of the newcomers were high 
compared to the old members of the EU.194 This implied that their accession would 
bring both challenges and advantages for the EU as a whole. 
           It is suitable to begin with benefits. Economically speaking, the enlarged 
customs union would enhance trade creation which would lower the production costs 
as member states would increase their product capacity. In this context, with an 
enhanced competition, there would be a decline in the prices which would contribute 
positively to the standards of living. Nonetheless, the trade creation was also based 
on the removal of all protectionist measures and on the adoption of common internal 
and external tariffs, thanks to the single market programme and common competition 
policy of the EU.195 Although there was a danger of trade diversion, it was only 
expected in the agricultural sector and generally, the EU members would gain from 
increased export and import inflows between the EU-15 and the CEECs. This 
positive picture would promote economic growth in the long term.  
           The second opportunity is the ascendant trend in the FDI flows. There was an 
effective growth in the inward investments and the most interesting point was the 
Slovakia’s potential. The inflows were only 270 million dollar in 1994 and it reached 
4,012 million dollar in 2002. Other countries also benefited from this positive trend 
and it pointed out that the credibility of these countries would increase more after 
their entry.196 It is possible to give some examples to prove this thesis. When Spain 
joined the EU its average investment flows increased by 1 % immediately as the 
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confidence grew more. “A similar boost to cross-border investment took place in the 
late 1980s within the EU-12 as a result of expectations driven by the single market 
process.”197 In general terms, it was expected that the CEECs would augment their 
investment capacity because the risk premium would fall after their accession and 
they would attract more investors. Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovenia’s cumulative FDI per capita was higher in the past and their entry would 
create a more stable environment.198 
           By turning our attention to the science, with an enlarged EU the overall 
spending dedicated to R&D activities would rise automatically and this meant that 
the EU would focus more on innovation and technological expansion. Although the 
EU-15 was already involved in high-tech industries, the CEECs position was not 
satisfying and they specialized in lower skilled products. However, thanks to the 
trade creation that would increase their share in the technology-oriented 
businesses.199 
           It is now necessary to move on to the possible costs of the accession of the 
CEECs. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one of the most important and 
expensive policies of the EU as it constitutes almost half of the EU budget. It is 
evident that some of the CEECs were heavily dependent on agriculture and they had 
ineffective farm industries. In Poland, 25 % of the workforce was employed in 
agricultural industries. The EU-15 had some concerns about the new budgetary 
allocations to these countries and the net beneficiaries’ share would decline after 
their entry. For example, they would get 25 % of the previous members CAP 
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support. This problem caused uncertainties about the future of the EU’s agricultural 
expenditures.200  
           The Structural and Cohesion funds were another handicap because the 
majority of the CEECs’ GDP was less than 50 % of the EU average and they had 
declining areas. Hence, they would receive more assistance from the ERDF, the 
European Social Fund and Cohesion Fund as they would be eligible for Objective 1 
of the Agenda 2000. 201 The entry of the EU-10 would increase the number of the EU 
citizens who live in Objective 1 regions from 25.3 % to 41.9 %. Also, the old 
member states would lose their eligibility. According to this negative scenario, the 
income levels of the EU would decrease and the number of the peripheral regions 
would rise automatically. Ultimately, this would cause budgetary turbulences.202 
Additionally, as it was noted in the second chapter, EU provides financial assistance 
to the areas whose GNP per capita are less than 90 % of the EU average and who 
have excessive budget deficits through the Cohesion Fund. The new members would 
be involved in these two criteria like Spain, Portugal and Greece. As a result, this 
would affect the functioning of the regional policy in negative terms.                     
           The fifth enlargement would pose a danger in fulfilling the Lisbon target of 
employment and the creation of a knowledge-based society. To be more specific, it 
would become more difficult to obtain an employment level of 70 % in the EU, 60 % 
for women and 50 % for older workers and to reach the rate of 3 % of GDP for R&D 
expenditures by 2010.203 Technological insufficiencies made them isolated although 
these countries were already industrialized. They were efficient in basic sciences like 
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physics, chemistry, mathematics and in some sectors of engineering but there was a 
considerable gap in the focus on high-tech industries or innovative actions.204 The 
number of R&D personnel was in a downward trend and the overall R&D spending 
was lower with an exception of Poland and Hungary. Accordingly, their accession 
would deteriorate the scientific progress. 
 
           5.1.2 A Comparative Analysis 
           The expansion of the European Union with its 27 member states and candidate 
countries cause some challenges to the integrity of the Union. In 2004, with the 
accession of Central and Eastern European Countries, the loss of enthusiasm was 
seen between various EU officials and countries due to the enlargement fatigue and 
possible disadvantages. That’s why it is suitable to observe the relevant statistics in 
order to understand the challenges. 
           The fifth enlargement process was economically helpful for the newcomers 
due to the variety of reasons which can be underlined as follows: Before their entry, 
thanks to the Europe Agreements that eliminated the tariff quotas for industrial goods 
put these countries in a better position to duplicate their export markets. In 2000, 60-
75 % of their exports went to other EU countries. After their admission, they adopted 
the same principles and mechanisms that were commonly accepted and this increased 
the confidence to these countries as they became Western.205 There were also some 
changes in their product line. In the 1990s, the CEECs’ export capacity was limited 
to labor and capital intensive products but they managed to export cars, car parts, 
electronics and pharmaceuticals to the EU. In Slovakia and in the Czech Republic the 
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automotive sector became an important element in their trade volume.206 Besides, 
with the help of the EU as an external anchor, an economic stability was achieved in 
some industries. Due to these reasons, the FDI level that comes from the EU reaches 
5-10 % of their GDP and it contributes positively to the establishment of new 
enterprises that operates in the automotive, electronics, furniture and pharmaceuticals 
industries.207 “Nevertheless, FDI levels from the old to the new member states 
amounted to 13.8 bn euros in 2004, almost double the 2003 number of 7 bn euros, 
according to Eurostat.”208 
           As regards the EU-10, the eastward integration forced them to implement new 
policies in order to compete with the lower costs. To take an example, Germany is 
undertaking a strict policy by shrinking its unit labor costs and this leads to some 
disturbances in the old member states like Italy and France. Nowadays, there is a fear 
that the eastern market with its lower taxes, ineffective social protection policy and 
with a fall in real wages can become much more competitive than the others and 
many believe that the investment boom is based on their economic policy. That’s 
why many other countries have also changed their strategy. Austria and Germany 
diminished their corporate tax rates in 2005.209 This means that there are many EU 
countries that enter the low-cost competition with the newcomers because they want 
to protect their economic stability and do not want to lose their markets. However, 
these will be very dangerous in the future, affecting the social cohesion sharply. 
           According to the recent statistics, the early members of the EU consider that 
the fifth enlargement wouldn’t create any efficient economic gain and it would bring 
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an average rate of only 0.4 % growth in trade, single market and FDI until 2010. 
Despite this fact, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic denoted that their 
membership would enhance an economic growth of 5.3 % for Poland, 7.3 % for 
Hungary and 4 % for the Czech Republic from 2005 to 2007.210 Ultimately, only 
France, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria could obtain higher trade and 
investment profits from their accession because other countries did not have any 
strong links with the CEECs that could accelerate their economic success. In this 
respect, Greece, Spain and Portugal would be the losers as they would not benefit as 
such from the structural funds and the increased competition would affect their 
economies negatively.  
           Actually, the previous member states’ concerns are economically legitimate. 
Although the real GDP growth between 2000 and 2004 was 2 % in the EU-15, it 
amounted to 3.6 % in the CEECs.211 Moreover, except Malta, all of the CEECs’ GDP 
growth was higher than the EU-25 average and the most noticeable progress was 
recorded both in Latvia and Estonia with a share of 9.8 % and 9.1 % respectively in 
2005.212 The economic growth was important in the catching-up process and this was 
in fact related with the elimination of trade barriers which brought a soaring level of 
export potential as well as better investment potential for these countries. But the 
disappointing point was that while analyzing the GDP per head in PPP it was evident 
that a majority were below 60 % in 2005. Nonetheless, there was a severe current 
account deficit problem. 
           Although the decrease in the number of the backward regions who’s GDP per 
head is below 75 % of the EU-27 average can be considered as a success, it is 
evident that the CEECs’ marginalized parts are greater than the rest. In 1995, 78 
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regions were labeled under the least developed regions. The CEECs had 51 regions 
and EU-15 had 27 regions. In 2004, the EU managed to decrease the problematic 
areas to 70 regions in which 49 belonged to the EU-12. When we assume that the 
EU-15 has 213 regions and the new members have 55 regions, most of the 
newcomers’ regions are problematic and their GDP growth does not seem to be a 
huge recovery. The unpleasant news is that the lower or negative growth rates in the 
areas whose GDP per head are more than 75 % of the EU as a whole which is mainly 
dominated by France, Italy and Germany’s regions.213 Perhaps, it is the impact of the 
additional regions that cause this unexpected development because through the 
funds, these new countries become the net beneficiaries. The former cohesion 
countries namely Spain, Greece and Ireland record a progress and Ireland becomes 
the second highest performer for GDP per head in PPP. Although Portugal’s growth 
was above the average until 1999, later on there was a slowdown in its economic 
capacity.214 So, with the accession of the new members, it becomes more difficult for 
the EU to reduce regional disparities because of the increased economic disorder that 
is caused by the CEECs. 
           By turning the attention to the budgetary resource allocation, the new member 
states were given financial assistance before their accession through special 
programmes like Phare, Ispa and Sapard with the aim of stimulating balanced 
development, better transport and environment infrastructure as well as rural welfare. 
For the period 1990-2003 approximately 10 billion euros were granted to the CEECs 
as a pre-accession strategy. Their entry did not put an end to the financial burdens 
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and 40 million euros were dedicated to these countries between 2004 and 2006. A 
majority of these payments were reserved for the regional, social and agricultural 
policy. Although the GDP level for the EU-10 was 4.7 %, the total expenditures 
allocated to the new countries reached 6.9 % of the EU budget in 2004 and their 
financial contributions to the budget remained limited (3.4 % in total ) with 0.1 % of 
their GDP.215 So, they were the net beneficiaries and the core countries were the 
largest contributors. The pre-accession aid for Romania and Bulgaria referred to 1.4 
billion euros in 2006 due to their economic imbalances and lower GDP potential 
which was below 50 % of the EU average. All of the new members will receive more 
in the current programming period of 2007-2013.216  
           The fierce competition between the former cohesion countries and the CEECs 
was seen in the new budgetary talks because the new members asked for additional 
support from the EU and despite the resistance of Spain, Greece and Portugal due to 
the decrease in their structural support, they achieved to receive more financial 
assistance. The core countries were really curious about their net contribution to the 
budget. Germany will be the largest contributor and the share of France, Sweden, 
Austria, the Netherlands and the UK will be duplicated.217 Farmers and the backward 
regions will be the beneficiaries. The total flow for R&D, innovation and 
infrastructure was decreased and constituted 8.4 % in the total budgetary 
expenditures; but the largest share was disbursed to the structural funds and 
agriculture. As many of the developed countries are not agriculturally-dependent and 
do not have larger rural areas, the new budget will be the chance of the lagging 
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regions. There will be a Budget Review for 2008-2009 and there is a possibility that 
this will change the budget framework but not in wider terms.218 Therefore, the 
limited resources for the regional competitiveness will have a detrimental effect for 
the regional policy because the most serious problem that the new member states 
have is the lack of scientific development, infrastructure and R&D. This 
technological gap will continue in the future but the CEECs will benefit more from 
the structural and cohesion funds which means that the core countries will be the net 
contributors. So, enlargement will create a potential gain for the newcomers while 
decreasing the share of the developed countries. There is no win-win type of 
situation then and as the CEECs have scientific insufficiencies, it seems that the EU 
continues to be far from the Lisbon target of a technology-oriented giant. 
           Under the three new priorities for the period 2007-2013 that are included to 
the old objectives of the regional policy namely convergence, regional 
competitiveness and employment as well as territorial cooperation; the EU gives 
financial assistance to its member states. When analyzing the total money granted to 
various parts, Poland receives and continues to get more money compared to other 
countries with a share of EUR 67,284. The Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Hungary and Romania will be the net beneficiaries. Luxembourg will be 
the country that receives less from the financial provisions and it will be followed by 
Denmark, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Austria, Finland and Belgium.219 The budgetary 
flows to other CEECs are quite high. These indices prove that these countries cause 
budgetary concerns. There are also other previous member states that are not well-
functioning but it becomes more difficult to solve the regional imbalances when the 
CEECs are included in the EU framework.  
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           Now, it is suitable to move on to another threat. The entry of the new member 
states engenders tensions from an agricultural perspective between different 
members. As most of them are agricultural-oriented countries “the EU’s utilized 
agricultural area increased by 25 %, agricultural production expanded by 10 % for 
most products, and the number of farmers increased by more than 50 %.”220 The 
lower productivity in farming and the higher level of agricultural employment which 
referred to 12.5 % in 2004 compared to 3.8 % in the EU-15 caused disorder about the 
future of the CAP. Poland, Latvia and Lithuania were above the average of the EU-
10 whereas Slovakia and the Czech Republic were close to the EU-15.  
           This negative performance can be attributable to the industrial division of the 
labor force because the regions whose GDP per head are below 50 % of the EU 
average employed mostly in agriculture and industry. The areas that pass beyond the 
GDP per head of 115 % and the other developed countries focus more on basic 
market, financial and public services. The 2003 data specified that the agricultural 
employment ranged from 17.1 % for the countries whose GDP was below 50 % to 
4.8 % for the areas whose GDP was between 75 % and 100 % to 2.1 % for the 
member states that had a GDP per head of 115 %.221 This is a kind of proof that the 
CEECs specialized in low value added activities rather than high value added ones 
because in most of them namely Romania, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia the share of 
agricultural employment was high.222  
           So, it is necessary to examine the recent developments in order to assess the 
impact of the CEECs on agriculture and rural development. Between 2000 and 2006, 
the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development 
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(SAPARD) was helpful for the newcomers in modernizing their farm structure, food 
sector and in promoting rural development. The EU provided other types of 
assistance that were not applied to the EU-15 in the past and the important thing was 
the progressive increase of direct payments from 2004 to 2013. Although the 
agricultural support was in an upward trend, the new members were required to 
adopt CAP directives such as the introduction of quotas for milk and sugar as well as 
specific measures to prevent overproduction. So, it is not suitable to talk about any 
discrimination between members for agriculture in that point.223 Food processing is 
another significant issue like direct payments. The CEECs’ FDI level in their GDP 
for the food processing and manufacturing was more than the EU-15 because of the 
low labor costs and cheap material. However, it is evident that the new members 
should focus more on the food industries to increase their competitiveness because 
their import level from the EU-15 was 31 % whereas the export rate was limited by 
25 % in 2004 for processed products. Nonetheless, in other agricultural industries 
also the share of their export capacity did not exceed their imports coming from the 
EU-15. Despite this negative formula, their agricultural trade ameliorated compared 
to previous years, reflecting positively to their income levels.224 In sum, the 
accession of the CEECs poses agricultural challenges in terms of direct payments 
and funds distribution. The major handicap is their insufficient growth potential 
despite the EU assistance. If this continues in the future, then they will remain a 
budget burden. Consequently, budgetary implications for the agriculture are quite 
complex and there is a possibility that they will get an outstanding amount from the 
CAP support in the near future. This can be based on the new decisions which will be 
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taken in the EU budget review for 2008-2009. 225  That’s why the net challenges are 
uncertain for the time period but it is a well-known issue that the CEECs’ 
agricultural dependencies and deficiencies continue to affect both the EU budget and 
the regional policy negatively.  
           Socially speaking, the fulfillment of the Lisbon policy is an obligation for the 
EU to stimulate cohesion. There is an upward trend in the share of female and older 
workers’ participation in the workforce by 2.7 % for the former and by 5.9 % for the 
latter since 2000. The female employment reached 56.3 % and the older workers’ 
employment amounted to 43.5 % in 2006. Unfortunately, Greece, Italy, Poland and 
Malta were below the EU average for female workers.226 As regards to older 
workforce, there were not enough countries that surpass the limit of 50 %. The trend 
in the total employment was similar. While for the EU-15 there was a gradual growth 
from 63.4 % in 2000 to 66 % in 2006, the level changed in the EU-27 from 62.2 % in 
2000 to 64.3 % in 2006. Almost a majority of the member states’ share was below 60 
% and the losers were Poland, Malta, Hungary, Romania, Italy, Bulgaria and 
Slovakia. Denmark, the UK, Netherlands and Sweden were the leaders with a share 
above 70 %.227All of these statistics emphasize that the EU is far away from its 
orientation due to its moderate and insufficient progress in the labor market. The 
CEECs cause a danger for the social cohesion. 
           To be more specific, a comparison is required to understand the gap between 
the previous members and the CEECs. According to the 2004 statistics, the total 
employment in the EU-15 was 64.7 % and for the EU-10 this level was only 56 % 
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because of employment turbulences in Poland, Malta and Slovakia. Only Slovenia 
and Cyprus surpassed the EU-15 average. Furthermore, Poland and Slovakia faced 
severe labor market crisis because in 2005 unemployment stood at 17.7 % in the 
former and 16.4 % in the latter. When we considered that the average was 7.9 % in 
the EU-15 in 2004, it was seen that the economic amelioration of the CEECs was not 
reflected in the welfare of their citizens because unemployment stood at 13.4 % in 
the EU-10. With respect to other countries, the unemployment level in Denmark, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and the UK varied between 4 % and 5 
%. The total level in Greece, Spain, Germany and France was approximately 9-10 %. 
There were huge variations between the two groups. Nonetheless, the gap continued 
in the female, older and youth employment. Poland’s and Malta’s deterioration lasted 
for the female employment with a share of 46.2 % for the former and 32.7 % for the 
latter. The EU-15 average was 56.8 % in 2004 and the EU-10 did not manage to 
catch-up (the level was 50.2 %). The older workers’ participation was one of the 
biggest confusions that caused uncertainties about the future. It was 42.5 % in the 
EU-15 and there was a huge gap because the level in the EU-10 was 32.3 % in 
2004.228 
           Overall, the future of the EU regional policy seems uncertain with the entry of 
new members into the EU and the integration process for regional competitiveness, 
employment and economic growth together is in jeopardy because the new members 
can not stimulate their socio-economic growth effectively. There are still wide 
disparities between the EU countries and the fourth and fifth enlargement packages 
emphasize that these countries will create a budgetary chaos for the funds and 
agricultural imbalances. Although there is an economic growth in the new members, 
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unemployment remains a future challenge. So, the EU still needs more time and 
money to enhance socio-economic cohesion. In some of the countries, there is a 
possibility that the last two enlargements will be their loss. For example, Ireland, 
which was one of the cohesion countries in the past, succeeds to be one of the less 
problematic areas. Unfortunately, with its changing status it will be one of the 
biggest contributors to the EU budget. This means that Ireland will get less from the 
structural and cohesion funds. Its balanced development can be negatively affected in 
the future. It is similar for the other cohesion countries like Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. Hence, the EU should make careful decisions for the regional policy by 
taking into consideration not only its new 12 countries but also its previous members. 
          
           5.2 Country-Specific Examples 
           In this section, some of the selected countries’ socio-economic developments, 
mainly the problematic ones, will be examined. The main reason is to outline the real 
cause of the deficiencies and achievements and to specify future expectations. 
 
           5.2.1 Poland 
           Poland which was one of the poorer in income per capita and the largest 
Central and Eastern European state in terms of population with its 38.6 million 
citizens in the 1990s began its transformation process in 1989. It was an agricultural-
oriented country and the agricultural share of employment was 22.1 %. According to 
the Polish experts, the accession to the EU would improve the country’s ineffective 
farming structure and the assistance that it would receive would be beneficial for 
Poland to modernize its agricultural industries. Before its entry, the country benefited 
from trade opportunities, thanks to the trade liberalization that contributed positively 
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to its export capacity and the EU became one of its trading partners by capturing 
almost 65 % of its exports and imports in 1997. Germany was an important export 
market for Poland. However, when comparing the country with other CEECs, its 
trade volume was not sufficient to be competitive in international markets during the 
1990s because the country emphasized clothes, furniture, coal and steel. 
Furthermore, it was not easy to talk about a trade boost after its accession because 
the previous EU members had already specialized in high-skilled products.229 
           After drawing a general framework, it is necessary to move on to the 
economic potential of Poland. The GDP growth was impressive compared to other 
CEECs and it managed to reduce its inflation level from 27.8 % in 1995 to 15.5 % in 
1997. In fact, inflation was still one of the serious problems that the country faced 
and there was a current account as well as a trade deficit that posed fluctuations in 
the real value of its currency.230 
           Unemployment trends were quite interesting. They ranged from 16.4 % in 
1993 to 13.2 % in 1996 to 10.3 % in 1997 to 10.4 % in 1998. Despite this shrinkage 
the regional disparities in terms of employment were wide. Its most developed region 
namely Warsaw succeeded to narrow its unemployment level but the gap continued 
in the periphery.231 
           Before its accession, Poland undertook serious regional development 
measures. The most important one was “the introduction of the voivodeship as an 
administrative region being the highest-level territorial unit of a mixed central 
government/self-government character, the basic one endowed with the task of 
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implementing regional policy.”232 The old territorial division of 49 regions was 
replaced by 16 new voivodeships. The major features of these 16 units were their 
bigger size, higher population and narrowed regional differences. In the previous 
system the favored regions could be described as the metropolitan areas such as 
Warsaw and Poznan.233  
           These changes did not have a strong impact in boosting its socio-economic 
development. After its entry, Poland continued to receive financial aid from the EU 
and all of its regions were eligible for objective 1 areas whose GDP was less than 75 
% of the EU average. Under the objective 2 parts that faced industrial uncertainties, 
18 areas were selected as lagging parts due to their unemployment problems. For the 
rural leg of this objective, the number was higher because of Poland’s agricultural 
inadequacies. The share of its agricultural population was higher than the EU and 
possessed a high unemployment rate. This meant that almost its entire regions were 
agriculturally problematic areas that jeopardize the economic and social cohesion of 
the EU.234  
           To conclude, it is useful to give some statistics. Poland recorded a GDP 
growth of 5.5 % in 2006 compared to 3.8 % in 2003. However, this level is expected 
to diminish to 4.7 % in 2007. Due to the minor fluctuations in the exchange rate, 
investment boom and effective external demand, its export capacity was augmented 
and contributed positively to the GDP growth. According to the European 
Commission forecasts its imports will exceed its exports in the near future. 
Unemployment that was a severe inconvenience decreased. For example, it was 19.6 
% in 2003, 19 % in 2004, 17.7 % in 2005 and 13.9 % in 2006. It will be 12.2 % in 
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2007 and 11.6 % in 2008. Although there was a sharp decrease in 2006, this can be 
attributable to the rise in early retirements that reduce the number of the workforce. 
Poland can not be able to reach any single-digit numbers; so employment continues 
to be a trouble. Annual HICP inflation was 1.5 % in mid-2006 and it will be 2.5 % in 
2007 because of the insufficient production that will increase food prices. Its trade 
and current account balance will continue to be negative and expected to mount up 
for the following two years.235 
           In sum, the transformation process is helpful for Poland in promoting recovery 
compared to the 1990s but there are still huge budgetary and employment problems 
that should be taken into consideration in order to augment the attractiveness and 
credibility of the country. If not, Poland will continue to be one of the future costs of 
enlargement. 
 
           5.2.2 Slovakia 
           The beginning of economic transformation in 1990 and the dissolution of the 
Czechoslovak Federation which made Slovakia independent in 1993 were equally 
important in changing the country’s macroeconomic status during the 1990s. 
Actually, Slovakia was dependent on the Czech Republic in trade because the Czech 
Republic was its major trading partner due to the accepted customs union agreement 
and captured 27 % of its total exports and 23 % of total imports in 1997.  
           The transformation process was in fact thorny at the beginning with a drop in 
GDP by 2.5 % in 1990 and 14.6 % in 1991. Fortunately, there was an amelioration in 
1994, thanks to the export boom and trade restrictions. In order to continue this 
growth potential, the government followed strict policies which resulted in current 
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account deficits and fiscal imbalances. Therefore, the economic performance became 
malignant at the end of the 1990s due to its huge budget deficit, insufficient level of 
privatization activities and low productivity.236  
           The labor market was also affected from this transition. In 1991, the total 
unemployment was 12 %. There were wide fluctuations and the level peaked at 15.6 
% in 1998, followed by 16.7 % in 1999.237 There were wide disparities between 
Slovakia’s regions. The Bratislava region was the most prosperous part with its 
higher productivity, employment and GDP per capita in PPS. None of the other 
regions were close to the average of Bratislava. In 1999, the total employment was 
48.5 % while it was 60.2 % in Bratislava. Its success was based on the growing 
number of SMEs, FDI and a service-based economy with high-skilled employees.238 
In 2001, the total unemployment rate was 18.6 % compared to 17.9 % in 2000. In 
Bratislava this level was only 5.8 % and in many of the Slovak regions the 
unemployment level was higher than 20 % both in 2000 and 2001.239 
           The economic position of Slovakia will be positive in the following two years 
due to the growing domestic demand and new export production facilities. There was 
a sharp increase in GDP growth from 4.2 % in 2003 to 6.7 % in 2006. This will be 
7.2 % in 2007. The trade imbalance will be minor in the future and the general 
government deficit is expected to be 3 % of GDP in 2007 which is one of the 
preconditions for joining the single currency area. The strong economic activity will 
be reflected positively in the employment trends. Slovakia managed to reduce its 
unemployment from 17.6 % in 2003 to 14.3 % in 2006 and it will be 13.3 % in 2007 
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as well as 12.9 % in 2008. Despite the progress, the country will not be able to 
overcome its unemployment problem.240  
           To sum up, like Poland, Slovakia causes a disorder for the Lisbon target of 
employment with its insufficiencies in active labor market participation. As it was 
described in the third chapter there is not any effective scientific progress in the 
majority of the CEECs and this will increase the gap between various members in 
terms of technological capacity. The share of Poland and Slovakia is less than 1 % of 
their GDP for R&D spending and they have infrastructural problems. This endangers 
the EU from being the most dynamic knowledge-based economy. Nonetheless, both 
Poland and Slovakia will be net recipients of the EU budget. 
 
           5.2.3 Germany 
           Germany was one of the most successful EU countries that benefited from 
macroeconomic stability during the 1970s and 1980s. It was able to cope with market 
pressures and competitive forces. During the 1990s, the willingness to participate in 
the euro zone area forced the country to follow restrictive fiscal policies which were 
conducted by Bundesbank in order to fulfill the convergence criteria. After the 
launch of the single currency, the slowdown in the employment figures and 
economic growth was evident. Germany was confronted with budgetary turbulences 
and recession. As a result, nowadays many called the country “Europe’s sick 
man.”241 Germany’s GDP growth rates diminished since the end of the 1990s and it 
was 1.6 % from 1992 to 2002 and amounted to -0.2 % in 2003. After that period 
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there was always volatility in the growth volume. The unemployment rate was 8 % 
from 1992 to 2002. However, it increased to 9.5 % in 2005.242 
           What were the main reasons behind this fall? In reality, the growth rates and 
employment trends were below the European Monetary Union (EMU) average since 
the late 1990s. For the budget deficit, the results were even worse. The major reason 
for this recession was the descending degree of growth capacity.243 The 
macroeconomic mismanagement which is related with wrong monetary, fiscal and 
wage policies can explain the socio-economic downturn in Germany.  
           After the introduction of the euro as an official currency, the European Central 
Bank and Bundesbank were responsible for the policy on inflation and interest rates. 
With the independent monetary policy of the ECB, the German government could 
not behave in accordance with its national priorities and could not adjust the 
exchange rates in favor of its national interests. That’s why changes in interest rates 
affected the investor’s decision negatively by deteriorating the economic progress. 
Wage policies had an impact on the price level and inflation because when wages 
augment more rapidly than the productivity, then inflation will rise and growth will 
fall automatically. As a result, the Central Bank tries to mount up its interest rates. In 
return, there is a possibility that a regression can occur.244 As Germany’s interest 
rates were high and investment level was not effective, these combined factors were 
the cause of this backwardness. 
           The common monetary policy of the ECB did not function in favor of 
Germany because its inflation rate was below the average that increased the interest 
rates, it had a higher output gap and its wage policies were not successful compared 
to other EMU countries. These made the internal and external demand to fall. As the 
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sovereignty was given to the ECB, Germany could not make necessary adjustments 
to ameliorate its economic position. With regard to fiscal policies, Germany should 
adjust its budget deficit levels in order to fulfill the requirements of the Stability and 
Growth Pact which meant that the budget deficit should be 3 % of GDP. So, the 
restrictive fiscal policy hurt the German economy. 245  
           In my point of view, without adjusting the interest rates to encourage large 
consumer purchases, Germany could not devalue its currency which could help its 
economy to be alive and powerful. Moreover, one country’s growth rate can be 
superior to the others. That’s why the independent monetary policy of the ECB can 
have both benefits and costs for the EU countries. For example, in the case of an 
economic slowdown, a country can not adjust its exchange rate regime and this can 
be dangerous by increasing its unemployment rate which brings a distrustful 
environment for the future of a county that reduces or stops the investment inflows. 
The competitiveness of a state will decline and this will have harmful effects for its 
trade potential. This shows that economic shocks can not be absorbed easily and 
stability can not be promoted with the independent monetary policy of the ECB. I 
think that Germany is one of the countries that are most severely affected after 
joining the euro zone area. “In order to improve its macroeconomic performance, the 
German economy needs a more expansive monetary policy at the Euro area level, 
less moderate wage setting exhausting the scope for distribution and more active and 
expansive fiscal policies at the national level.”246 
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           5.2.4 Ireland 
           Ireland is the most successful former cohesion country that achieves to reduce 
its disparities and obtain a worthy progress. Its economy has been transformed since 
the 1990s by recording a GDP growth of 7.6 % from 1990 to 2001 and employment 
augmented by 4.7 % in the period of 1993-2001. There was a sharp reduction in 
unemployment rates. It was 15.9 % in 1993 and reached 4.3 % in 2000. The trade 
volume of the country became 17.6 % of its GDP in 2002.247 Because of these 
reasons, the country benefited from an economic boom although it was one of the 
underdeveloped countries in the past. It managed to become a contributor to the EU 
budget in recent years. 
           When we examine the Irish case, it is evident that the country’s good 
performance is based on the investment inflows after the end of its financial crisis 
during the 1980s. Thanks to the single market, industrial-led plan and structural 
funds assistance Ireland succeeded to overcome the unemployment problem and its 
income growth surpassed the EU average.248 In addition, the Social Partnership 
Agreements that involved the “wage moderation via the promise of future reductions 
in income taxes” helped to solve its fiscal chaos as well as to make a progress in the 
labor market.249 Institutional arrangements dealt with social inclusion. Structural 
funds that were mainly dedicated to improve physical infrastructure, human capital, 
production-investment aid as well as income support increased the competitiveness 
and educational activities of the country. The reduction in corporation tax made 
Ireland attractive for foreign investments because in the past the high taxation system 
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was one of the reasons for its economic imbalances.250 The free market policy and 
active industrial strategy allowed multinational companies to enter into the Irish 
market and augmented the export capacity of the country. The Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA) promoted tax incentives and as a result electronics, 
pharmaceuticals as well as financial service sectors grew rapidly with the 
contribution of foreign companies.251  
          How does this economic progress have an effect on social outcomes such as 
poverty? Although there was a decline in consistent poverty, the relative poverty 
level mounted up. Also, there was a growing inequality in Ireland. At this point, the 
growth in employment did not result in ameliorating the living standards, solving the 
poverty problem and raising the wage levels.252  Moreover, the government spending 
on social protection decreased from 20.2 % of GDP to 14.1 % from 1993 to 2000. 
However, the EU average was 27.3 % in 2000. This downward trend continued also 
in education expenditures.253 So, the economic boost does not favor socially-
vulnerable groups but in general, Ireland’s progress is convincing enough and in the 
near future the country will be more powerful. 
           According to recent statistics, GDP growth will continue to be strong in both 
2007 and 2008 due to the high level of domestic demand, investment flows and 
export growth and the unemployment level will be less than 5 %.254 Despite the 
malignant potential in some social statistics, Ireland is one of the good performers in 
the EU with its effective macroeconomic management, industrial strategy and social 
partnership policy. Compared to other former cohesion countries, it is the leader in 
terms of economic growth and employment opportunities. 
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           It is worth noting that Ireland’s history can be considered a success story but it 
does not mean that the other former cohesion countries achieved to promote real 
convergence. Mezzogiorno in Italy, Greece and Spain are still the lagging areas. 
When we compare these countries with the CEECs it is seen that their socio-
economic performance is better. So, the CEECs still need time to ameliorate their 
current status. Hence, after creating welfare development, the EU can consider 
adding new countries in its chain. Otherwise, the budgetary and agricultural 
challenges will be doubled, causing a real divergence between the EU countries by 
decreasing the share that they receive from the structural assistance. In this context, it 
is possible to indicate that enlargement causes socio-economic turbulences for the 
regional policy because it can not function effectively when the number of countries 
is multiplied. It becomes hard to absorb new members and it is an indication that the 
structural funds do not promote effective development. As a result, the challenges 
outweigh the benefits after the entry of the newcomers especially for the previous 
members because when comparing the CEECs statistics with the other members, 
they can be labeled as the marginalized parts despite their respectable share of the 
EU assistance. In reality, the basic principles of the regional policy such as 
enhancement of regional competitiveness, education and training facilities, social 
inclusion and economic stability can not be appropriately put into practice because of 
the increase in the number of backward countries in the EU. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
           In this thesis, the enlargement process of the EU with respect to its reflection 
on the regional policy has been studied. The major emphasis is on socio-economic 
picture of the EU-27 and selected statistics are underlined in order to show the 
winners and losers of integration. 
           The real motive behind the establishment of the EU was the promotion of 
peace and security in Europe to overcome the negative consequences of the Second 
World War. When the Community reached nine, the new member countries of 1973 
namely, the UK, Denmark and Ireland were interested in economic gains that would 
come from the membership. The newcomers from the second and third enlargement 
that made Greece, Spain and Portugal as part of the EU caused budgetary challenges 
because they were economically poor countries. The main reason behind the fourth 
integration for new joiners that welcomed Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995 was 
to be a part of the free trade agreement as well as decision-making. The significant 
point was that these countries did not create any socio-economic turbulence for the 
EU. The fifth enlargement allowed 10 countries to join the EU framework in 2004. 
However, some of these countries were the former communist states that were 
divided from Europe for many years and they were economically unstable which 
meant that they would create tensions between the member states. Their orientation 
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towards the EU was related with the aim of economic progress and stability. The last 
enlargement was finalized with the entry of Romania and Bulgaria together in 2007. 
           As the number of participants is in a rising trend and the EU imports both the 
gains and problems of the member countries at each time, it becomes important to 
enhance economic and social cohesion. It can only be achieved by giving financial 
assistance to the countries which face industrial decline, scientific gap, territorial 
imbalances, economic downturn due to the high level of inflation, current account 
deficit, low level of GDP growth, social problems like unemployment, poverty and 
social exclusion. That’s why the regional policy targeting strong dynamism, regional 
stability, better education, scientific development, economic sustainability, 
competitiveness, equal opportunities in the workplace, creation of additional job 
opportunities, an increase in the social standards, a more Lisbon-oriented policy of 
growth, employment and technological amelioration as well as innovative society by 
capturing a noticeable share in the world markets provides structural and cohesion 
funds to the EU states. These special funds are the basic financial instruments that 
have a vital role in resource distribution. Although each is dedicated to boost 
regional solidarity, they have different responsibilities.  
           In this context, the major question is: Considering the EU-27, is regional 
policy successful enough to solve regional disparities in an enlarged EU? The answer 
is evidently no because when one examines four different reports on economic and 
social cohesion, it is clear that there are huge differences between the EU countries 
and it becomes really difficult to sustain socio-economic unity. Economic capacity of 
the member states during the 1990s was a good illustration to show that the four 
cohesion countries such as Portugal, Greece, Spain and Ireland achieved to minimize 
their regional disparities but they had continuing disturbances. The entry of the 
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CEECs changes the economic capacity of the EU as a whole. The recent trends show 
that although there is a GDP growth in these countries their GDP per capita in PPP is 
lower than the EU-15. They are generally described as the losers of enlargement in 
terms of economic efficiency. The negative performance of the newcomers puts their 
participation in the single market in danger. Their current account deficit is in an 
accelerating trend; their inflation level is greater than expected. Any possible delay to 
join in the euro zone area will hurt regional competitiveness. Turning our attention to 
social trends, the unemployment is a permanent question mark, distorting the welfare 
and social solidarity of the EU. The most suffering countries are the CEECs mainly 
Poland and Slovakia. Furthermore, due to the insufficient increase in the 
participation of the female and older workers in the workplace, it becomes harder to 
reach the Lisbon target of employment. This trouble is in fact related with the 
balance of payments crisis, low productivity and investment as well as the lack of 
education facilities that decrease the number of the qualified employees. There is a 
lack in implementing more active policies in investing the human capital, creating 
better social protection systems and solving the problem of poverty. The need to 
enhance regional solidarity continues in technological industries because the 
heterogeneity lasts in R&D expenditures, patents application and infrastructure. It is 
an obligation for the EU countries to specialize in high-tech industries, to create 
employment opportunities in scientific sectors in an attempt to catch-up with the 
global leaders and to become a knowledge-based Union. However, R&D spending is 
below the Lisbon rate of 3 % of GDP and transport infrastructure and 
telecommunications need more financial resources in some of the EU members.255 
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Once again, the major reason behind this scientific gap is the CEECs who are not 
able to compete effectively with previous members.  
           Before their admission, there were different attitudes towards the CEECs 
because their economic backgrounds were not recorded with huge successes. 
Previous members had some concerns because trade creation, strong investment and 
economic ties would not be achieved if they became members. The CEECs can be 
labeled as the main threat behind the regional policy because they have more regions 
that are lagging behind, they have serious social problems and they receive more 
from the financial provisions that place them as the beneficiaries. For example, in the 
current financial programming period that will last between 2007 and 2013 the 
budgetary disputes make their mark on negotiations and the former cohesion 
countries protest to the unequal resource allocation which are mainly granted to these 
newcomers. However, it seems that the CEECs will continue to get more from the 
funds and the EU budget compared to other members because they have serious 
uncertainties regarding the R&D, infrastructure and scientific development. Their 
entry also equals to a recession in agricultural future of the EU because the number 
of farmers and agricultural land increase greatly. The most important point is their 
low productivity in agriculture-oriented industries despite their high level of 
agricultural employment. Employment-related troubles are equally important with 
other challenges. When comparing the basic data, it is evident that the CEECs are not 
able to catch-up with the previous members in the female, older and total 
employment rates. All of these realities denote that the entry of the CEECs cause 
handicaps for the regional policy. 
           To this end, the main finding of this thesis is that the costs of enlargement 
outweigh the benefits and when the number of countries is doubled, it is tough to 
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create economic and social cohesion. The EU does not absorb the CEECs yet and 
there are still wide deficiencies between its members. However, the less favored 
countries of the 1990s have made some progress. Ireland, Portugal and Spain benefit 
from an economic recovery, they succeed to increase their credibility and Ireland 
becomes one of the richest countries of the EU. There is a fact that the CEECs’ 
socio-economic problems are more serious than the least developed regions of the 
1990s and it is harder to govern the EU-27 than the EU-15. Therefore, there is a 
socio-economic divergence rather than convergence in the EU because it does not 
become the most competitive and dynamic economy by reaching its target level in 
the R&D expenditures that is 3 % of GDP and by promoting an employment rate of 
70 % in general, 60 % for women and 50 % for older workers. It is difficult now to 
boost competitiveness, job opportunities, social unity and economic amelioration. So, 
the enlargement policy of the EU has negative effects on the regional policy due to 
the unequal financial transfers, agricultural uncertainties, budgetary challenges as 
well as severe socio-economic gaps that prevent the EU to achieve its objectives. 
This chaos leads to unconformity between countries that brings many unanswered 
questions like how the EU can function with its 27 members and beyond; or will it be 
possible for the previous members to defend that the benefits are more than the 
challenges? 
           In this context, it is suitable to give some recommendations. The EU is not 
ready to deal with the new enlargement that will multiply the socio-economic 
disorder and that will constitute an obstacle to its basic goals of unity, solidarity and 
convergence. When it grows in size and population, the share of the old members 
that they receive from the funds and the budget decreases automatically. This does 
not only cause tensions between the members which creates loss of enthusiasm about 
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the uniqueness and benefits of the enlargement but also leads to the unequal budget 
distribution to the isolated regions because it is difficult to minimize the regional 
troubles and to enhance harmonious development if the funds are inappropriately 
distributed to the problematic areas. Therefore, without creating sensible solutions to 
the enlargement burden, it is not reasonable to add new members. Secondly, in order 
to respond rapidly to the new technological changes which are based on globalization 
of international markets the EU can focus more on the establishment of an 
innovative-based economy by augmenting the share of the technological 
expenditures from the EU budget. It can support more the creation of the innovative 
centers that facilitate operation in overseas markets. Socially speaking, education and 
training activities can be enhanced to ameliorate the skills and qualifications of the 
EU citizens who are the participants of the labor force. By investing more on 
education, the creation of additional jobs can be enhanced and social exclusion can 
be overcome because one of the biggest reasons of the employment-related problems 
and poverty is the low skilled personnel. It is worth noting that the attractiveness of 
part-time works or flexible working can be advanced via better working conditions 
and new arrangements in the work places. This will increase the employability of the 
women and older people. As social protection puts an obstacle to the budget, the 
system of early retirement can be eliminated because the EU has demographic 
problems with its aging population and the lack of baby boom. The European Social 
Fund and the European Employment Strategy can be given more emphasis because 
the newcomers have unemployment problems that harm their quality of life. That’s 
why in order to promote social welfare investing in human capital by educational 
facilities, modernization in the work places and rearrangement in the social 
protection should be the main focus. These measures can reflect positively to the 
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economic growth of the EU members because there is a strong link between the 
social and economic amelioration. It can be legitimate to adopt new economic 
policies because even the biggest economies of the EU like Germany have economic 
problems. This is in fact related with the strict monetary policy to fulfill the euro 
requirements. The common economic policy of the European Central Bank needs to 
be reorganized as economic shocks can not be absorbed easily. Country-oriented 
measures are necessary to stimulate convergence. There is heterogeneity rather than 
homogeneity in economic growth. So, the EU can give more importance to its 
assistance package to Objective 1 areas that are below 75 % of the EU GDP per 
capita average. Furthermore, the EU can give more incentives to the members who 
try to increase their countries’ attractiveness by strengthening their investment and 
trade links with other countries. With these formulas in mind, it will be easier to 
promote sustainable development.  
           Special reports, working documents, theses and articles can focus more on the 
EU candidates’ socio-economic performance, their pros and cons for the regional 
policy because it is possible that they will become new members. As the main 
argument of this thesis is that the enlargement affects negatively the regional 
development activities of the EU new reports can emphasize also specific measures 
to increase the competitiveness of the countries, to ameliorate the conditions in the 
peripheral regions and to create balanced development. This can be helpful for 
academicians, politicians and EU officials to design a roadmap in dealing with 
regional disparities. 
           To sum up, in the near future it seems that the enlargement may pose more 
challenges rather than opportunities for the member states by increasing the isolated 
areas. The gaps may continue in labor, social standards, economic growth and 
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technology because of including more countries into the EU. The ageing problem 
may be more harmful compared to the past because of the lack of employment 
creative measures. There may be a rise in the number of the older workers and retired 
people which means that health care systems may pose budgetary chaos. Due to this, 
the net contribution of the members may increase sharply. It is also possible that the 
euro zone problems may accelerate more because some of the member countries face 
economic decline and they can not meet the economic criteria of the single market 
with their huge budget deficits, insufficient FDI flows and inflationary pressures. It 
may be difficult for the CEECs to ameliorate their socio-economic position within a 
short time because the lessons that are learned from the past integrations are that the 
former cohesion countries are still the problematic parts except Ireland. So, there 
may not be an optimistic future for the regional policy without finding immediate 
solutions to the enlargement dilemma. 
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